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BANKRUPTCY
Honorable Harlin Hale*
Nicole L. Hay**

I. INTRODUCTION
Courts at all levels were busy issuing bankruptcy opinions during this
Survey period. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court issued five, which must be
close to a record for the high court. This Survey is a selection of cases the
authors believe will have the most impact on lawyers and how they counsel their clients in insolvency proceedings.
II. JURISDICTION
A. HOW COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS A STERN CLAIM—EXECUTIVE
BENEFITS INSURANCE AGENCY V. ARKINSON
Stern v. Marshall1 continues to affect bankruptcy practice. Thankfully,
in two cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided much needed direction. Two terms after that watershed decision in Executive Benefits Ins.
Agency v. Arkinson, the Supreme Court faced the question of how bankruptcy courts should proceed when faced with a Stern claim.2 The Supreme Court answered this question by establishing a bright-line rule.
The facts of Executive Benefits were rather straightforward. The Chapter 7 trustee filed a complaint in bankruptcy court against the corporate
debtor, alleging that the debtor used “various methods to fraudulently
convey” assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate.3 The bankruptcy court
granted the trustee’s motion for summary judgment against the debtor.
On appeal, the district court conducted de novo review and affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s ruling and held that the debtor had impliedly consented to
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, and therefore the adjudication was
* The Honorable Judge Harlin D. Hale is a bankruptcy judge for the Northern District of Texas and an adjunct professor of Creditors’ Rights at the SMU Dedman School of
Law.
** Nicole L. Hay graduated from SMU Dedman School of Law in 2011 and served as
law clerk to the Honorable Judge Harlin D. Hale in 2015–2016 and as temporary clerk to
the Honorable Judge Stacey G. Jernigan in 2015.
Contributing law students and externs to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Texas include Sarah Aboukhair, Chance Hiner, John Sager and Trevor Spears
from SMU Dedman School of Law; and McRae Cleaveland and Patrick Geddes from LSU
Law School.
1. 464 U.S. 462 (2011).
2. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2168 (2014).
3. Id. at 2169.
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permissible.4
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the parties
had consented below, but instead tackled the more challenging task of
providing bankruptcy courts with a roadmap to follow when facing a
Stern claim.5 Where a Stern claim was raised before a bankruptcy court,
the Supreme Court held, absent party consent to adjudicate, the proper
course was to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that
would be reviewed de novo by the district court as if the parties had
raised a non-core claim.6 The Supreme Court supported this holding
based on the severability provision of 28 U.S.C. § 151, which holds intact
the remaining provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in the event that one
provision is struck down.7 Under this reasoning, although the core proceeding provisions of § 157(b) were unconstitutional as to a Stern claim,
the remainder of the Bankruptcy Code remained in full force and effect.8
As a result of § 157(b) being stricken, the Stern claim proceeded under
the only remaining applicable provisions for non-core claims, found
within § 157(c).9 The Supreme Court clarified that the determination did
not turn on whether the claim was a core or non-core claim but whether
the claim was “otherwise related to a case under” the Bankruptcy Code,
as opposed to “arising in” or “arising under.”10
The practical effects of this case could be limited by the Supreme
Court’s decision last term in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, described below.11 A bankruptcy court may be inclined to proceed
with caution until consent is further defined by the case law. If consent to
adjudication of an apparent Stern claim is unclear, a bankruptcy court
should follow the road map established by Executive Benefits and issue
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
B. CONSENT

TO

JURISDICTION—WELLNESS INTERNATIONAL
NETWORK, LTD. V. SHARIF

In this Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court finally ruled on whether
parties could consent to adjudication of a Stern claim in bankruptcy court.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network, Ltd v.
Sharif12 will undoubtedly save district courts’ dockets from a torrent of
bankruptcy matters. With this ruling, it seems the Supreme Court is supplying § 157(c)(2) the constitutional backbone it has desperately needed
since Stern v. Marshall.13
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
See id. at 2170.
Id. at 2173.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
See generally id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012).
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In Wellness, the Chapter 7 debtor (Sharif) failed to respond to Wellness, a listed creditor, regarding questions about a trust that Sharif
claimed was outside his estate.14 Wellness initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking, among other things, non-dischargeability of Wellness’s
claims and “a declaratory judgment that the [t]rust was Sharif’s alter
ego.”15 In his answer, Sharif did not dispute that “the adversary proceeding was a ‘core proceeding,’” and in fact, sought a ruling in his favor.16
The bankruptcy court then entered a default judgment against Sharif in
the adversary proceeding, because Sharif did not comply with discovery
rules. The bankruptcy court determined the trust’s assets, if any, belonged
to Sharif’s bankruptcy estate based on an alter ego theory, which became
the controversial Stern claim.17 The Seventh Circuit disagreed that the
bankruptcy court could enter final judgment on Wellness’ alter ego claim
and the Supreme Court accepted the case.
The Supreme Court confronted the constitutional issue of whether litigants may validly consent to adjudication of their case by bankruptcy
courts. The Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,18 which held that “[a]s a personal
right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication [was] subject to waiver.”19 The ultimate question, the majority
claimed, was “whether allowing bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims
by consent would ‘impermissibly threate[n] the institutional integrity of
the Judicial Branch.’”20 The Supreme Court answered this question in the
negative.21 In reaching this conclusion and permitting adjudication by
consent, the Supreme Court relied in large part on the statutory framework that permitted district courts to refer cases to bankruptcy courts for
hearing, either sua sponte or on request.22
Practical considerations also may have helped sway the decision in
Wellness. The majority acknowledged the influx of cases in district courts
due to Stern.23 Moreover, Congress had already enhanced the capacity of
district courts through the mere existence of bankruptcy judges; it would
seem ignorant, if not absurd, to ignore bankruptcy judges’ proficient capacity to adjudicate Stern claims when both parties consented to such adjudication. The pragmatic values of “increasing judicial efficiency and
checking gamesmanship” were identical to the values that “motivated
[the] adoption . . . for consent-based adjudications by magistrate
14. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 135 S. Ct. at 1940.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1941.
17. Id.
18. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
19. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 135 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)).
20. Id. at 1943 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851).
21. Id. at 1944–45.
22. Id. at 1945.
23. See id. at 1946.
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judges.”24
What constitutes consent? The Supreme Court declared that nothing in
the Constitution or the relevant statute required consent to be express.25
Instead, it applied the implied consent standard in Roell v. Withrow.26
Whether implied or express, the majority noted, consent always needed
to be knowing and voluntary.27 The Supreme Court did not decide
whether Sharif consented to adjudication, but left the determination to
the Seventh Circuit to decide on remand.28
The majority did not confront the question of whether the bankruptcy
court’s adjudication of the alter ego claim violated Article III based on
Stern. In the dissent, Chief Justice Roberts was quick to point out this
oversight.29 The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court should not have
addressed the broader question of whether parties could consent to adjudication of a Stern claim in bankruptcy court, because the alter ego claim
was not a Stern claim.30 The dissent expressed its opinion that the majority had created much ado about nothing.31
Looking at this case from afar, the most glaring constitutional concern
was the battle between functionalism and formalism. The majority was
abundantly clear that the question of consent should be answered “with
an eye to the practical effect” and not by “formalistic and unbending
rules.”32 Yet, this opinion begs follow-up questions. What satisfies implied consent? The Supreme Court remanded that issue in this case to the
Seventh Circuit but it will surely lead to varying results in multiple cases.
The Supreme Court’s reliance on Schor will also likely cause confusion.
The Supreme Court reiterated that Schor permitted waiver of the right to
“impartial and independent federal adjudication” to the extent that the
structure of the Constitution was not implicated.33 When the Schor rational is read conjunction with the Supreme Court’s reliance on the language of 28 U.S.C. § 157, a potential issue arises.34 The Supreme Court
does not define what implicates the structural principle of separation of
powers, but it is clear that a bankruptcy court cannot adjudicate a Stern
claim to final resolution.35 How does this reconcile with Wellness? Do no
24. Id. at 1948.
25. See id. at 1947.
26. Id. at 1944–45; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 538 U.S. 580, 590
(2003).
27. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 135 S. Ct. at 1948 (citing Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S.
580, 588 n.5 (2003) (“‘notification of the right to refuse’ . . . ‘is a prerequisite to any inference of consent’”)).
28. Id. at 1948–49.
29. See id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1954.
31. Id. at 1959.
32. Id. at 1944 (majority opinion).
33. See id. at 1942.
34. See id. at 1947 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012) (that “a bankruptcy court must
obtain ‘the consent of all parties to the proceeding’ before hearing and determining a noncore claim”)).
35. See Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3257–58.

2016]

Bankruptcy

19

Stern claims implicate the structural separation of powers? If so, it seems
that any proficient attorney could argue, with merit, that this same rational should apply to non-core proceedings as well.
C. “RELATED

TO”

JURISDICTION—IN

RE

GALAZ

In In re Galaz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dissected
the requirements for a “related to” claim for purposes of subject-matter
jurisdiction and reiterated the general rule that “‘related to’ jurisdiction is
lacking in connection with third-party complaints.”36 The case involved a
Chapter 13 debtor who filed an adversary proceeding against her ex-husband, his father and the company that the father owned (collectively, the
Defendants).37 The debtor claimed that her ex-husband fraudulently
transferred assets to the father’s company from a company that the exhusband had owned with a partner, Julian Jackson (Jackson). The debtor
also claimed that her ex-husband, who had transferred half of his interest
in the former company to her as a result of their divorce, breached a
fiduciary duty he owed to her on account of her company interest. After
the Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Jackson, he counterclaimed, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims.38 The
bankruptcy court ruled in favor of both the debtor and Jackson, and the
district court, after first remanding for a recalculation of damages,
affirmed.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower courts, determining that
Jackson’s claims “[would] not result in any recovery for [the debtor], nor
[would] they have any effect on her bankruptcy case.”39 These claims,
therefore, did not satisfy the standard for “related to” jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).40 But the debtor’s claims differed; a judgment in her
favor “could, at least conceivably, increase the size of [her] bankruptcy
estate.”41 These claims, therefore, established “related to” jurisdiction
and the lower courts had properly characterized them as non-core matters under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).42
The problem, however, was that the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet
decided Wellness and the bankruptcy court had entered a final judgment
on the “related to,” non-core matters based on the parties’ implied consent.43 At the time of the opinion, the Fifth Circuit recognized that this
issue of consent was on certiorari before the Supreme Court. But because
the Supreme Court had not yet resolved the issue, the Fifth Circuit’s precedent declaring that consent could not cure constitutional deficiencies
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

In re Galaz, 765 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 428–29.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 431–32.
Id.
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prevailed.44 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, remanded and ordered the district court to consider the bankruptcy court’s ruling on the debtor’s claims
as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.45 After Wellness, this
outcome would have been different and the Fifth Circuit would, almost
certainly, have affirmed based on implied consent.
D. JURISDICTION OVER INDEMNITY CROSS-CLAIMS—IN

RE

KSRP

In a post-Wellness case raising issues similar to those in In re Galaz, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in In re KSRP, upheld dismissal of an adversary proceeding, finding that cross-claims for indemnity
and contribution from the bankruptcy debtor were strong enough to establish “related to” jurisdiction.46 As in In re Galaz, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s cross-claims against the debtor under the
“conceivable effect” test, and upheld the bankruptcy court’s determination that it had jurisdiction to issue a recommendation and report to the
district court.47 The interesting issue in the case confronted by the Fifth
Circuit was not whether the indemnity and contribution claims indeed
could conceivably affect the bankruptcy estate, but whether jurisdiction
was prevented because the claims lacked merit.48 The Fifth Circuit “reject[ed] this dichotomy,” refusing to conflate merits with jurisdiction.49
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that an exception to the general rule
against conflating the two did exist, if the claim “[was] not colorable, i.e.,
if it [was] ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or [was] ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”50 Under Texas law
and the Limited Partnership Agreement that governed the relationship
between the plaintiff and the debtor, the claims for contribution and indemnity were not “wholly insubstantial or frivolous.”51 Although the
Fifth Circuit noted that it reviewed jurisdiction when the lawsuit was removed, its conclusion that the claims were not frivolous was supported by
the two-day bench trial that the bankruptcy court held on the claims.52
As a precedential matter, it is significant that the Fifth Circuit has
deemed indemnity and contribution claims sufficient to establish “related
to” jurisdiction under rather common facts. Practitioners should note, as
a practical matter, the great benefit of winning the jurisdictional battle in
the bankruptcy court level for purposes of appeal.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 432.
In re KSRP, 809 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 267–69.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 267.
Id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11, 515 (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 269.
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III. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
A. COMPENSATION FOR FEE-DEFENSE UNDER § 330(A)(1)(A)—
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. V. ASARCO L.L.C
The bankruptcy court’s fee award to Baker Botts L.L.P. for fee-defense
in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of ASARCO was nothing out-of-the-ordinary under the flexible bankruptcy scheme for fee approval, although the
amounts at issue were certainly large enough to draw attention.53
Under § 327(a), ASARCO retained Baker Botts L.L.P. and Jordan,
Hyden, Womble, Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (together, Baker Botts) as
debtor’s counsel in their Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Baker Botts represented
ASARCO in a number of bankruptcy matters and proceedings. The case
was extremely successful, and after four years in bankruptcy, ASARCO
emerged from Chapter 11 with $1.4 billion in assets, little debt, and very
few liabilities.54 At the conclusion of the bankruptcy case, Baker Botts
filed fee applications under § 330(a)(1), which provides that a bankruptcy
court “may award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by professionals hired under § 327(a).”55 The debtor’s parent company, from which Baker Botts had recovered fraudulent transfers
and which then-controlled ASARCO, challenged the requested compensation.56 The bankruptcy court rejected these challenges and awarded
Baker Botts $120 million for their work in the bankruptcy case plus another $4.1 million as a fee enhancement for their performance. The bankruptcy court further awarded $5 million to Baker Botts for time spent
defending their fee applications. ASARCO appealed this award to the
district court, which affirmed. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the
award of attorneys’ fees for fee-defense, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit’s reversal.57
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, started with the “bedrock
principle” that statutes should be read with the presumption that they do
not deviate from the American Rule, which requires each party to bear
its own costs.58 Typically, he wrote, the Supreme Court has found an intent to shift fees where statutes expressly references a “‘prevailing party’
in the context of an adversarial ‘action.’”59 This narrow premise, inapplicable to many matters in bankruptcy, was a portent for the Supreme
Court’s holding. The majority looked to Congressional intent in drafting
§ 330(a)(1)(A)’s allowance of “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” and found that “Congress did not expressly depart from the American Rule to permit compensation for fee-defense
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2163 (2015).
Id. at 2163.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2163.
Id.
Id. at 2164.
Id.

22

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 2

litigation” for § 327(a) professionals.60
In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the Supreme Court had held
that “Congress ma[d]e specific and explicit [its] provisio[n] for the allowance of attorneys’ fees,” showing an intent to replace the American
Rule.61 The dissent critiqued that the majority was in fact carving out the
scenario of fee-defense litigation from this specific and explicit provision.62 The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court had previously found
fee-shifting for fee-defense litigation under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, despite the fact that this specific scenario was not in the text.63 The
majority countered that this was not a carve-out; if Congress had intended to permit fees for fee-defense litigation, it would have done so
with language similar in specificity to other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code, such as § 110(i) or other statutes, such as the Equal Access to Justice Act.64 Section 110(i) specifically allowed fee-shifting for fees incurred
in litigating a bankruptcy petition preparer’s fraud.65 The Equal Access to
Justice Act awarded fees to the prevailing party for any civil action under
the Act.66 In the eyes of the dissent, this level of specificity required too
much of Congress.67
The majority’s opinion was predicated upon the meaning of the term,
services rendered, under § 330(a)(1)(A).68 The dictionary defined the
term services as “labor performed for another.”69 The majority noted that
the Supreme Court had previously construed this provision as implying
disinterested and loyal service.70 Along with § 327(a), which the majority
interpreted as authorizing employment of professionals “to serve the administrator of the estate, for the benefit of the estate,” it followed that
§ 330(a)(1)(A) only contemplated reasonable compensation for labor
performed for the estate administrator and in the estate’s interest.71 The
majority concluded that a professional’s defense of its fees was not “labor
performed for” the estate administrator, much less disinterested labor.72
The United States and Baker Botts both addressed the meaning of
“services” under § 330(a)(1)(A), but differed in position. Baker Botts argued that fee-defense qualified as a service provided to the estate administrator.73 As Amicus Curiae, the United States urged that fee-defense
litigation was not considered a service by itself, but was compensable as a
component of an underlying service provided by the attorneys for the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2171–72.
Id. at 2165–66 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2166; see also 11 U.S.C. § 110(i).
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2171–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2171.
Id. at 2165 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2164–65.
Id. at 2165.
Id. at 2166.
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estate.74 Compensation for the underlying services rendered would be diluted if compensation for fee defense work was not awarded.75
The dissent adopted the government’s argument regarding the definition of “services” and pointed to two provisions in support of a possible
award of fees incurred for fee-defense litigation.76 First, the dissent reasoned it was within the bankruptcy court’s discretion to determine if feedefense litigation was a relevant factor of services rendered under
§ 330(a)(3).77 Similarly, § 330(a)(6) directed a bankruptcy court to account for the level of skill required to prepare a fee application in awarding fees for that service.78 The dissent noted that this provision was not
the authority for compensating the preparation of a fee application, but
assumed that this compensation was authorized as an “actual, necessary
servic[e] rendered” under § 330(a)(1).79 How could the Supreme Court
decide that the preparation of a fee application was a compensable service under § 330(a)(1) but the support of that fee application was not? In
a particularly memorable spar in the opinion, the majority responded to
this criticism by analogizing a professional’s preparation of a fee application to a mechanic’s preparation of a bill for services.80 The bill preparation was a service to the customer just as the fee application preparation
was a service to the estate, because the product enabled the customer and
estate to understand and even protest the billing.81 The dissent cleverly
quipped that this analogy did not support the majority’s distinction between preparation and defense, because a mechanic would not charge its
customer “for the time spent on preparing the bill.”82 On the contrary,
Congress allowed this type of compensation explicitly under § 330(a)(6)
and implicitly under § 330(a)(1), which showed its intent to compensate a
broader genre of actions than provided by the majority’s narrow interpretation of “services.”83
The policy concerns adopted by the dissent reflected concerns undoubtedly shared by estate professionals. The dissent urged that the majority’s interpretation of § 330(a)(1)(A) “undercut a basic objective”
underlying the bankruptcy scheme: making “high-quality attorneys . . .
available to trustees.”84 In an earlier case, Perdue v. Kenny A., the Supreme Court had determined that a reasonable fee for a § 327(a) professional was a fee sufficient to induce professionals into service for the
trustee.85 To be comparable with non-bankruptcy law practice, the dissent
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 2170.
at 2172.
at 2167 (majority opinion).
at 2172 (Breyer, J., dissenting opinion).
at 2172–73.
at 2170–71.
(citing Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)).
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maintained, a bankruptcy court may need to award fees for fee-defense in
certain cases.86 Indeed, the American Rule usually arose outside of bankruptcy in a two-party dispute, whereas multiple parties in interest could
object to the fees of a debtor’s professionals within bankruptcy.87 The
majority’s response to these concerns was not a denial. Instead, it was
common adage that it was not the role of the Supreme Court to make
policy, but rather the role of Congress.88
The Supreme Court’s ruling in ASARCO quite possibly created fertile
ground for fee opposition in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. As a market
response, debtor’s attorneys include specific terms promising compensation for fee-defense fees in their engagement agreements. Given a bankruptcy court’s role as gatekeeper for fee compensation under § 330, it is
unknown whether these contractual terms will be upheld or determined
unenforceable. From an academic perspective, the ASARCO opinion
raises questions about whether the ruling forecloses compensation for
fees incurred by a debtor’s attorneys in all matters of an adversarial nature. What if a debtor’s attorney was compelled to litigate to enforce a
carve-out of his fees under a cash collateral order? Is there an opening for
bankruptcy courts to award fees where a litigious creditor or party-ininterest, rather than the debtor, protests? Certainly future litigation will
test the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term
“services” under § 330(a)(1)(A). The majority referenced a number of
standards in this interpretation, including whether the labor was “in the
best interests of the estate,” disinterested and loyal, or primarily benefitted the professional.89 Which standard or mixture of standards courts will
apply to fee application matters following ASARCO is perhaps less certain than before.
B. PROSPECTIVE STANDARD

FOR

FEE AWARDS—IN

RE

WOERNER

While ASARCO disappointed bankruptcy debtor attorneys across the
country, bankruptcy professionals in the Fifth Circuit saw hope in a recent ruling. Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
overruled the much-criticized Pro-Snax attorney fee standard that had
drawn ire for years.90 In In re Pro-Snax, the Fifth Circuit established a
hindsight “material benefit” analysis for the award of attorney’s fees
under § 330.91 The hindsight analysis required fee applicants to prove that
their service resulted in an “identifiable, tangible, and material benefit to
the bankruptcy estate.”92 In an en banc ruling, In re Woerner, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the hindsight standard established in Pro-Snax.93 In
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 2171.
Id. at 2168–69 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2165.
See In re Woerner, 783 F.3d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 2015).
See In re Pro-Snax Distrib., Inc., 157 F.3d 414, 426 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
In re Woerner, 783 F.3d at 268.
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hindsight, the Fifth Circuit replaced the hindsight analysis with a prospective inquiry into whether the services were “reasonably likely to benefit
the estate” at the time performed.94 This new prospective approach to
attorneys’ fees mirrors that of the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits,95
will undoubtedly afford bankruptcy court more discretion in fee awards,
and comports with the statute.
In In re Woerner, Barron & Newburger (B & N) represented a Chapter
11 debtor.96 The bankruptcy court later converted the case to Chapter 7.
With its services no longer needed, B & N filed an application for fees in
excess of $130,000. The bankruptcy court awarded B & N nearly $20,000
of the requested fees and disallowed the remainder. The district court
affirmed and the law firm appealed, “contending that the bankruptcy
court misapplied Fifth Circuit precedent and . . . § 330 in reducing” the
fee award.97 A panel of three judges on the Fifth Circuit affirmed. But at
the suggestion of all three judges on the panel, the Fifth Circuit agreed to
reconsider this affirmance and the controlling precedent of Pro-Snax en
banc.98
Revisiting Pro-Snax, the Fifth Circuit began with the text of
§ 330(a)(3)(c), which directed bankruptcy courts to consider “whether
the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the
time at which the service was rendered” in determining fee compensation.99 The Fifth Circuit noted that the temporal language in
§ 330(a)(3)(C) was added by the 1994 Amendments to the bankruptcy
code.100 Additionally, § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii) required a bankruptcy court to
disallow compensation for services “not reasonably likely to benefit the
debtor’s estate.”101 Read together, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
plain language of these texts foreclosed a retrospective, material benefit
standard.102 Pro-Snax, the Fifth Circuit remarked, relied upon a case that
construed § 330 pre-1994 Amendments.103 The Fifth Circuit pointed to
the legislative history behind the addition of temporal language in these
amendments to support its conclusion that a prospective standard should
be applied.104
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit opined that the prospective standard
“permit[ted] a court to compensate an attorney not only for activities that
were ‘necessary’ but also for good gambles.”105 This “good gamble” rhet94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 276.
See id.
Id. at 268.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).
In re Woerner, 783 F.3d at 268.
Id. at 273 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(C)).
Id. at 275.
Id. at 273 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii)).
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 274.
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oric, originally mentioned in In re Taxman Clothing Co.,106 may sound
broad, but the rhetoric demands caution to those thinking all actions will
be awarded by the courts. Attorneys must still prove that these good
gambles were “objectively reasonable at the time they were made,” even
if the gamble did “not produce an ‘identifiable, tangible, and material
benefit.’”107 Under the Fifth Circuit’s new prospective standard, it is still
apparent that results matter. Attorneys for the estate will still have to
justify their fees, and under ASARCO, they will most likely need to pay
for defending them.
IV. PROCEDURE
A. FINAL ORDERS—BULLARD V. BLUE HILLS BANK
Because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills
Bank, a Chapter 13 debtor will be confronted with a Hobson’s choice
after the denial of plan confirmation. In Bullard, the bankruptcy court
denied confirmation of the debtor’s third amended plan.108 The debtor
appealed the denial to the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
(BAP).109 The BAP commenced its analysis with the general rule that an
order must be final to be appealable as a matter of right. The confirmation order, the BAP determined, was not final because the debtor was
“free to propose an alternate plan.”110 Nevertheless, the BAP treated the
appeal as discretionary under § 158(a)(3) and affirmed the denial of plan
confirmation.111 The First Circuit disagreed that the BAP could exercise
its discretion to hear the appeal because it had failed to certify the appeal
under this discretionary provision.112 Therefore, whether the order was
appealable depended on its finality. On this point, the First Circuit agreed
with the BAP and the majority of circuits in deciding that the order denying confirmation was not a final, appealable order.113
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split concerning whether a
denial of confirmation was a final order in favor of the majority and also
the mortgagee.114 The decision hinged upon the meaning of an immediately appealable “proceeding” under § 158(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.115
The Supreme Court rejected the debtor’s argument that each proposed
plan in bankruptcy constituted a proceeding and instead held that a proceeding entailed the entire plan confirmation process, including multiple
proposed and denied plans.116 Without lingering on the textual analysis,
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 313 (1995).
In re Woerner, 783 F.3d at 274.
See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1690–91 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1691; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
In re Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1690–91.
Id.
Id. at 1692.
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1691–92.
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the Supreme Court turned to the practicalities and policies regarding appeals in the plan context.117 The Supreme Court reasoned that a denial of
plan confirmation, as opposed to a grant, did not resolve or solidify the
obligations between the debtor and creditors such that finality
occurred.118
In aid of its decision, the Supreme Court focused upon the impact that
a plan denial had on creditors, due to the general leeway a Chapter 13
debtor received in presenting multiple plans for confirmation.119 Consumer bankruptcy attorneys, creditors, and debtors alike are familiar with
a bankruptcy court’s typical practice of giving a Chapter 13 debtor multiple bites at the confirmation apple. But in emphasizing this marathon for
creditors, the Supreme Court gave short shrift to the practical effect of its
holding upon a debtor seeking to confirm a Chapter 13 plan.120 After
Bullard, a Chapter 13 debtor whose plan is denied confirmation will be
confronted with the difficult choice between proposing a new plan for
confirmation and waiting until dismissal to appeal. Moreover, a debtor
will need to obtain a stay pending appeal after dismissal, because dismissal eliminates the benefit of the automatic stay. The Supreme Court’s response to this consequence in Bullard, and what most debtors’ attorneys
will likely turn towards, was that a debtor can seek discretionary review
of an order denying confirmation under § 158(d)(2).121 A rise in these
interlocutory appeals may appear if the courts seem amenable to their
certification. But if courts do not favor allowing discretionary review,
Chapter 13 debtors and their attorneys are faced with a Hobson’s choice:
proposing a less-favorable plan or letting the denied plan ride.
B. WHO IS

A

CREDITOR FOR PURPOSES
IN RE BUESCHER

OF

STANDING?—

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re
Buescher handed mortgage companies and their attorneys a major procedural victory. In Buescher, the bankruptcy court denied joint debtors, Mr.
and Mrs. Buescher, their discharge because of First United Bank’s (First
United) adversary proceeding seeking denial of the debtors’ discharges
under § 727(a)(2)–(5).122 First United loaned Mr. Buescher a $19 million
loan for his home-building business, which he personally guaranteed.123
In the adversary proceeding, Mrs. Buescher argued that First United had
no standing to object to her discharge. The bankruptcy court rejected this
standing argument and denied Mrs. Buescher’s discharge after a bench
117. Id. at 1692–93.
118. Id. at 1692.
119. Id. at 1693.
120. Id. at 1692–93.
121. Id. at 1695; 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2012).
122. In re Buescher, 783 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2015); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)–(5)
(dealing with knowing or fraudulent concealment of property or books and information,
knowing or fraudulent misrepresentations, and failure to satisfactorily explain a loss or
deficiency in assets).
123. In re Buescher, 783 F.3d at 305.
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trial.124 The district court affirmed.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit began with the statutory text of § 727(c),
which gave only “[t]he trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee”
the ability to object to a debtor’s discharge under § 727(a).125 Mrs.
Buescher argued that First United was not her creditor, because she, unlike her husband, had not personally guaranteed the loan from First
United.126 She had no contractual relationship with First United that
would make her personally liable.127 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed.128 Under the Texas Family Code § 3.202(c), “First United ha[d]
an in rem claim against any community property” jointly held by the
debtor spouses.129 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, First United
would be able to pursue an in rem action against Mrs. Buescher.130 The
Fifth Circuit then turned back to the statutory text.131 The Bankruptcy
Code defined a creditor as including an “entity that has a community
claim.”132 A “community claim” was defined as a claim for which an entity could look to “property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2)” for
relief.133 Section 541(a)(2) included sole or joint management community
property of the debtor as well as property that could be liable for an
allowed claim against the debtor and his spouse.134 Following this logic,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that First United was a creditor of Mrs.
Buescher, because it could seek to satisfy its claim against community
property that became part of Mrs. Buescher’s bankruptcy estate.135 First
United, therefore, had standing to object to her discharge.136
Through its standing determination in favor of the mortgagee in
Buescher, the Fifth Circuit provides leverage, not only to mortgagees, but
also to any creditor who has an in rem claim against a debtor’s community property. At first blush, debtor spouses may rethink the benefit of
joint filing when creditors of community property exist. But this thinking
is deceptive, because under state law, an in rem creditor could proceed
against a non-filing spouse’s jointly managed community property.137 The
holding in Buescher simply aligns an in rem creditor’s rights in bankruptcy with those outside of bankruptcy.138 It is important, however, to
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1)).
126. Id. at 305.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 306.
129. Id. (referring to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.202(c) (West 2016)); see also United
States v. Loftis, 607 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Section 3.202(c) . . . renders all jointlymanaged community property subject to the nontortious liabilities incurred by [the debtor
spouse].”).
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (2012).
133. Id. § 101(7); In re Buescher, 783 F.3d at 306.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2); In re Buescher, 783 F.3d at 306.
135. In re Buescher, 783 F.3d at 306.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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realize that standing is merely a preliminary hurdle and creditors, like
those in Buescher, still have a high burden to prevail on an objection to
discharge under § 727.
C. STANDING UNDER THE “PERSON AGGRIEVED” TEST—FORTUNE
NATURAL RESOURCES CORP. V. UNITED STATES DOI
In Fortune Natural Resources Corp. v. United States DOI, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-emphasized the “person aggrieved” test for bankruptcy standing and resolved that a creditor had no
standing to appeal a sale order that did not include assets in which it had
an interest.139 Fortune involved a creditor with a working interest in an
oil and gas lease belonging to a Chapter 11 debtor (the Lease).140 The
creditor and debtor had also entered into a joint operating agreement
prior to bankruptcy, under which the debtor was required to perform certain decommissioning obligations related to the Lease. In Chapter 11, the
debtor sought to sell certain assets that the Lease did not include. By
agreement with the Department of Interior, the debtor would establish a
trust fund to pay certain decommissioning obligations.141
The bankruptcy court upheld the sale and the creditor appealed, arguing that it was harmed by the sale because the debtor would be left without assets to pay its decommissioning costs under the joint operating
agreement.142 The creditor also protested the exclusion of its Lease from
those that would receive trust distributions under the final sale order.143
Subsequently, the district court dismissed the creditor’s appeal for lack of
standing and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.144
In affirming the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit relied upon its previously
established person aggrieved test, noting that this standing test for bankruptcy was more stringent than a test for constitutional standing.145 The
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the creditor showed that the sale order
could adversely affect it economically.146 But in order to satisfy the “person aggrieved” test, the creditor must show that the creditor would have
received funds from the bankruptcy case had the bankruptcy court not
entered the sale order.147 Because a large variety of outcomes can occur
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the high burden that the holding in Fortune imposes on a creditor for bankruptcy standing may bar a significant
number of appeals.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Fortune Nat. Res. Corp. v. United States DOI, 806 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. at 365–66.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 367.
Id.
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V. FRAUD
A. WHETHER FRAUD REQUIRES

A

MISREPRESENTATION—IN

RE

RITZ

Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), a debt is excepted from discharge if
“obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud.”148 In the context of a perceived circuit split,149 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether a representation was
necessary to satisfy “actual fraud” under the Bankruptcy Code.
In re Ritz dealt with three important players: a lender, a corporate
debtor, and an individual who owned a significant portion of common
stock in the corporate debtor.150 Prior to the lender initiating debt collection proceedings, the individual began a series of transfers that repositioned the corporate debtor’s funds into various entities, all of which
were controlled by the individual.151 In light of these transfers, the lender
sued in federal district court, attempting to hold the individual personally
liable for the $163,999.83 debt.152 This lawsuit was interrupted when the
individual filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge
his debt with respect to the lender.153 The lender objected, filing a complaint to except the debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A).154 Specifically, the lender claimed that the individual had
committed actual fraud with respect to the debt.155 In determining what
constituted actual fraud, both the bankruptcy court156 and the district
court, held that a misrepresentation to obtain the debt was required for a
showing of actual fraud, and the record was devoid of such false representation.157 Without a misrepresentation by the individual to obtain the
debt, the lender’s actual fraud claim was meritless.158
In its appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the lender relied on the Seventh Circuit decision that dealt with similar facts: McClellan v. Cantrell.159 McClellan stood for the proposition that actual fraud was not limited to
misrepresentations, but was a broad term meant to encompass other
fraudulent activities.160 This broad use of actual fraud led the Seventh
148. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
149. See In re Ritz, 787 F.3d 312, 317 n.6 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded, Musky
Int’l Elec. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016); see also McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th
Cir. 2010).
150. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 314.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2016) (noting the
statute deals with limited liability exceptions and “piercing the corporate veil”).
153. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 315.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
155. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 315.
156. See also id. (The bankruptcy court also held that the lender could not pierce the
corporate veil on a theory of “actual fraud” under Texas Business Organizations Code
§ 21.223(b) because no misrepresentation occurred).
157. Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added) (noting that the subsequent transfer of funds was
not connected to obtaining the debt).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 316.
160. See id. at 317; see McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Circuit, in a split decision, to hold that fraudulent conveyances intended
to hinder the creditor constituted “actual fraud” under § 523(a)(2)(A),
and thus non-dischargeable debt.161
Relying upon Fifth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well
as Bankruptcy Code provisions and underlying policy, the Fifth Circuit
dismantled the lender’s argument.162 First, noting that “no subsequent
appellate court ha[d] adopted the interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) endorsed by the McClellan majority,” the Fifth Circuit adopted the definition of actual fraud as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Field v.
Mans.163 Looking to the 1978 common law meaning of actual fraud, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537, and Prosser’s Law of Torts, the Supreme Court in Field declared that actual fraud required justifiable reliance, and thus assumed throughout its opinion that a false representation
was a necessary prerequisite to a finding of actual fraud.164 Moreover,
nowhere in Field did the Supreme Court state that actual fraud carried a
different meaning depending on the fraud committed.165 Instead, a
proper interpretation of the case implied a uniform definition of actual
fraud under the 1978 common law meaning of the term—a common law
meaning that did not encompass fraudulent transfers.166
Besides disagreeing with McClellan’s interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent, the Fifth Circuit found McClellan at odds with its own precedent, in which it had affirmatively stated (on multiple occasions) that representations were a required element for non-dischargeability under an
actual fraud theory.167 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that McClellan’s
broad construction of actual fraud rendered other exceptions to discharge
redundant, and further noted that an actual fraudulent transfer was an
exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2)(A).168 The Fifth Circuit also pointed to prevalent Bankruptcy Code policy that aimed to grant
debtors a fresh start, emphasizing that exceptions to discharge should be
construed in favor of debtors to relieve them from preexisting financial
burdens and entitle them to a fresh start.169 In sum, the Fifth Circuit held
that a representation was a necessary prerequisite to a finding of actual
fraud, and without any showing of one in the record, the debt was not
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A).170
161. McClellan, 217 F.3d at 894–95; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
162. See In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318–20.
163. See id. at 317.
164. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 68–71 (1995).
165. See In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318; see also Field, 516 U.S. at 70.
166. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 318.
167. Id. at 319; see RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1293 (5th Cir. 1995);
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Acosta (In re Acosta), 406 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2005).
168. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 320; see 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2)(A) (2012) (“The court shall
grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . . the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
a creditor . . . has transferred . . . property of the debtor.”).
169. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d. at 321; see Fezler v. Davis (In re Davis), 194 F.3d 570, 573 (5th
Cir. 1999).
170. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 321.
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In between the time of this Survey’s initial drafting and its publication,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided the actual fraud circuit split after granting certiorari in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz.171 In a 7-1
decision, the Supreme Court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s view and held
that, for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), the phrase actual fraud did not necessarily require a false representation.172 Instead, the Court held that actual fraud included any fraudulent conduct with intent to defraud.173 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the history of common law fraud.174 Additionally, the Court noted that Congress specifically amended § 523(a)(2)(A) to add the phrase “actual fraud”—so it was
unlikely that Congress intended to contribute no additional meaning to
the statute that already included false pretenses and false
representations.175
The sole dissenter, Justice Clarence Thomas, asserted that the majority’s ruling read the requirement that the debt be “obtained by” actual
fraud out of the statute.176 The majority opinion sidestepped this issue by
asserting that “the recipient of the transfer . . . with the requisite intent
. . . can ‘obtai[n]’ assets ‘by’ his or her participation in the fraud.”177 In
response, the dissent noted that the Bankruptcy Court had “found that
there was no evidence that [the transferor] transferred the funds to
avoid” paying his debts—implying a lack of fraudulent intent.178
VI. ESTOPPEL
A. LIMITATIONS ON A COURT’S EQUITABLE POWER
EXEMPTIONS—LAW V. SIEGEL

TO

DENY

Law v. Siegel179 was an important U.S. Supreme Court bankruptcy
case, but was understated at the time—so understated, in fact, that it
failed to make the cut for inclusion in the last bankruptcy survey. Over
the past couple of years Siegel has emerged from the shadows to raise
questions about the extent of a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers to
estop a debtor’s use, or arguably abuse, of exemptions in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy courts, accustomed to broad equitable powers, have increasingly grappled with the opinion, and have interpreted it to pose serious
limitations on their ability to do equity. In Siegel, the Chapter 7 debtor
claimed a $75,000 California state exemption in his homestead, worth approximately $363,348, as provided by § 522(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The debtor also claimed that two voluntary liens encumbered the
homestead and that the value of these liens exceeded the non-exempt
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
Id. at 1586.
Id.
Id. at 1586–88.
Id. at 1586.
Id. at 1590–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 1589 (Sotomayor, J., majority decision).
Id. at 1592 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014).

2016]

Bankruptcy

33

value of the house.180 The Chapter 7 trustee was unconvinced and proved
through litigation that one of these liens was a sham, fraudulently created
by the debtor to preserve the equity in his home.181 Presumably, the
debtor would have been able to retain his house had the liens both been
valid because no unencumbered value would exist in the house for distribution to unsecured creditors upon sale. Because the trustee was successful in invalidating the lien, equity existed and the homestead was sold. In
this process, the trustee incurred more than $500,000 in attorneys’ fees
over a period of five years, seeking to invalidate the fraudulent lien, defending against numerous appeals and overcoming objections by the
debtor.182 As a result of the debtor’s misconduct, the bankruptcy court
granted the trustee’s request to surcharge the debtor’s $75,000 homestead
exemption to defray the attorneys’ fees.183
On appeal by the debtor, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (B.A.P.) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the surcharge,
holding that Ninth Circuit precedent permitted an equitable surcharge of
a statutory exemption under exceptional circumstances, such as a
debtor’s “inequitable or fraudulent conduct.”184 The majority noted that
the Tenth Circuit disagreed with this precedent, but rejected its criticism.185 Notably, Judge Markell filed a concurring opinion in which he
acknowledged being bound by the Ninth Circuit precedent, but questioned whether it remained good law.186
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit B.A.P. After writing a
brief primer on Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Justice Scalia, for the majority,
commented upon a bankruptcy court’s equitable and inherent powers.187
Justice Scalia acknowledged a bankruptcy court’s broad powers under
§ 105(a) to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Bankruptcy Code, and
inherent power to sanction abusive litigation matters.188 The majority
opinion continued, however, with a qualification—the exercise of these
powers could not “contravene specific statutory provisions.”189 This limitation was the crux of the Supreme Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court
determined that the homestead surcharge contravened the exemption
provisions found in § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code.190 Section
522(b)(3)(A) permitted the debtor to claim the $75,000 homestead exemption under California law.191 “Except in particular situations speci180. Id. at 1190.
181. Id. at 1193.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1194 (citing Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2004)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1192.
188. Id. at 1194 (citing Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76
(2007)); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
189. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1194.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1195 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A)).
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fied in the Code” not applicable in the case, the Supreme Court stated,
this claimed exemption “‘[wa]s not liable’ for the payment of ‘any [prepetition] debt’ or ‘any administrative expense.’”192
In holding that the surcharge contravened § 522, the Supreme Court
gave little attention to the trustee’s argument that the surcharge qualified
as an “administrative expense” under § 503(b) for purposes of reimbursement, but not as an administrative expense for purposes of § 522(k)’s prohibition.193 The Supreme Court determined that the trustee’s
interpretation did not comport with the general rule of statutory construction that words appearing in different sections of a statute be given
the same meaning.194 Similarly, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
trustee and United States’ amicus curie’s argument that § 522 did not
grant a debtor an absolute right to retain an exemption regardless of all
circumstances.195 The Supreme Court rejected the characterization of the
surcharge as denial of an exemption because the trustee had failed to
object and seek denial in the case.196 Even if the Supreme Court did
agree with this characterization, Justice Scalia wrote, if the debtor
claimed an exemption under § 522, “the court [could] not refuse to honor
the exemption absent a valid statutory basis for doing so.”197 Where a
debtor elected state exemptions, a bankruptcy court could rely upon state
law to surcharge or otherwise deny the exempt property.198 Absent a
state-created exception, federal law did not allow a bankruptcy court to
deny or surcharge an exemption unless specified by the Bankruptcy
Code.199
B. DENYING EXEMPTION AMENDMENTS AFTER LAW V. SIEGEL—
IN RE SALDANA
The ruling in Law v. Siegel has gained notoriety, or fame, depending on
one’s perspective, as numerous courts have begun to interpret its holding
to impose a severe limitation upon a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers
with regards to not only exemptions, but also re-characterizations of debt
to equity.200 Some critics now argue that these bankruptcy courts have
interpreted Siegel too broadly.201 In the Fifth Circuit, the issue arose in
the case of In re Saldana, which has been appealed to the U.S. District
192. Id. at 1192 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)).
193. Id. at 1195 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(k)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1196.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1196–97.
199. Id. at 1197.
200. See, e.g., In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015); In re
Westry, 591 F. App’x 429, 432 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Gray, 523 B.R. 170, 173–74 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2014); In re Saldana, 531 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015); In re Baker, 514 B.R.
860, 863 (E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Arellano, 517 B.R. 228, 231–32 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2014).
201. See, e.g., Neil C. Gordon & Jonathan C. Azoff, Law v. Siegel Dicta Leads Lower
Courts Astray, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 78 (2015).
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Court for Northern District of Texas for determination.202 In In re Saldana, the debtor belatedly sought to amend his homestead exemption,
more than an hour into a hearing on the trustee and largest creditors’
objection to his original homestead claim (the Objection Hearing).203 The
debtor’s attorney, in fact, expressed this intent to amend the homestead
exemption midway through the debtor’s direct testimony on the witness
stand. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a show cause order that (i) granted the trustee’s objections as to
certain parcels; (ii) continued the hearing on the trustee’s objection to
homestead exemption; and (iii) ordered the debtor to amend his homestead exemption claim.204 If the debtor elected to file an amended homestead exemption, he was ordered to (i) show cause as to whether bad
faith or other estoppel arguments precluded such amendment; (ii) explain
why this intent to amend was not raised at the beginning of the Objection
Hearing; and (iii) explain why the debtor should not have to pay the fees
and costs of the trustee, his attorney, and the objecting creditor’s attorney
related to the Objection Hearing.205 After the debtor filed an amended
homestead exemption and a hearing was held on all objections and show
cause issues, the bankruptcy court issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law.206
Although ruling on the surcharge of exempt property, the bankruptcy
court determined that Siegel “implicitly overruled prior case law . . . that
enabled a bankruptcy court to deny an amendment to the debtor’s homestead exemption based on bad faith or prejudice to creditors.”207 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court still had authority to address the debtor’s
behavior. Relying upon Siegel’s dicta that its decision did not “denude
bankruptcy courts of the essential ‘authority to respond to debtor misconduct with meaningful sanctions,’” the bankruptcy court exercised its inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct, which it found coterminous
with its authority under § 105(a).208 The debtor’s conduct, the bankruptcy
court found, satisfied the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that a court find a
party’s conduct “in the course of litigation” to be “callous and recalcitrant, arbitrary, and capricious, or willful, callous, and persistent” before
shifting fees.209 Based on this finding, the bankruptcy court found the
debtor and his attorney jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of
$5,109.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs to the largest creditor and
$25,245.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs to the trustee.210
202. In re Saldana, 531 B.R. 141 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d in part, remanded in
part, 534 B.R. 678 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
203. Id. at 151–52.
204. Id. at 153.
205. Id. at 153–54.
206. Id. at 154–55.
207. Id. at 161.
208. Id. at 163 (citing Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1998 (2015)).
209. Id. at 166–67 (referencing Rogers v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., Int’l, 988 F.2d 607,
615–16 (5th Cir. 1993)).
210. Id. at 168–69.
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The debtor and his attorney appealed the bankruptcy court’s finding of
bad faith and sanctions.211 The issues on appeal, specific to an interpretation of Siegel, include whether the bankruptcy court applied the wrong
standard or failed to satisfy the proper standard for a finding of bad faith
and imposition of sanctions.212 The debtor and his attorney also appealed
on the grounds that the debtor’s attorney and the debtor were given insufficient due process regarding the sanctions, and that the bankruptcy
court erroneously imposed the sanctions based upon First Amendment
rights and valid, good faith assertions of privilege.213
The procedural due process issue may have more traction with regards
to the debtor’s attorney, who was not expressly ordered to show cause
after the Objection Hearing. If the debtor’s attorney alone prevails on
this argument, the sanctions against the debtor may still stand. From a
precedent point of view, the interesting question will be if and how the
district court and, perhaps the circuit court thereafter interprets Siegel’s
dicta regarding a bankruptcy court’s inherent and § 105(a) powers to
sanction in the context of exemptions. Any higher court that affirms will
need to reconcile Siegel with the sanctions, whereas a reversal could occur without any Siegel discussion.
C. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL—ALLEN V. C&H DISTRIBS., L.L.C. AND
UNITED STATES EX. REL. LONG V. GSDMIDEA CITY, L.L.C.
Allen v. C&H Distribs., L.L.C. reflected an application of judicial estoppel that was much more familiar in the Fifth Circuit than the scot-free
outcome of cases flowing from Law v. Siegel.214 In Allen, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that joint debtors, husband and wife, were judicially estopped from pursuing a personal injury claim on behalf of the wife.215 The wife was allegedly injured from the collapse of a stool on which the wife had been
sitting. The alleged personal injury occurred one month after the joint
debtors confirmed their first Chapter 13 plan. The debtors subsequently
amended their plan three times, but never disclosed the personal injury
claim in their bankruptcy, despite the fact that they filed a state court
lawsuit pursuing the personal injury claim just over one year after the
first plan’s confirmation. The bankruptcy case closed, but the debtors did
not receive a discharge because they failed to complete their financial
management courses.216 Despite the debtor’s failure to disclose the bankruptcy in discovery, the defendants in the state court lawsuit learned
211. Notice of Transmittal at 8, Saldana v. Saldana, No. 3:15-cv-1918-L (N.D. Tex. Jun.
6, 2015), ECF No. 1.
212. Appellant’s Brief at 4–5, Saldana v. Saldana, No. 3:15-cv-1918-L (N.D. Tex. Jun. 6,
2015), ECF No. 6.
213. Id.
214. Allen v. C&H Distribs., L.L.C., 813 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2015).
215. Id. at 570.
216. Id.
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about the non-disclosure in bankruptcy and moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard of review to
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, but it notably applied an
abuse of discretion standard to the judicial estoppel determination because it was an equitable doctrine.217 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the three
elements necessary for judicial estoppel: (i) An inconsistent legal position; (ii) judicial acceptance; and (iii) the lack of inadvertence.218 First, in
assessing the inconsistent legal position, the Fifth Circuit emphasized its
prior recognition that a debtor had a “continuing obligation to disclose
post-petition causes of action.”219 Second, the Fifth Circuit found judicial
acceptance, despite the debtors’ failure to receive a discharge, because
the bankruptcy court had accepted that no personal injury claim existed
when it confirmed the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan.220 Third, the debtors satisfied the test for lack of inadvertence because they had a financial motive to conceal the personal injury claim.221 Under this rationale, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the debtors’ argument that they lacked motive because
they erroneously thought the cause of action was not a property of the
estate and therefore, not required to be disclosed.222
An interesting aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Allen was its consideration of an equitable gloss over the ruling—whether applying judicial estoppel led to an inequitable result.223 Here, an inequity would
result if the case were reopened, because a new lawsuit by the trustee
would be time-barred.224 The Fifth Circuit considered this argument, in
light of Reed v. City of Arlington, and modified the holding of the lower
courts in a manner that, perhaps, gives Allen its greatest significance.225
Whereas the district court had noted that the trustee could seek to reopen
the case and pursue the cause of action, the Fifth Circuit, acknowledging
that the statute of limitations would have also run against the trustee,
provided that a trustee could substitute in for the debtors and “pursue the
claim within a reasonable time.”226 Perhaps this finale preserves the claim
for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and creditors.
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case with similar
facts, United States ex. rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C.227 In Long, a
Chapter 13 debtor failed to disclose his qui tam actions based on viola217. Id. at 571–72.
218. Id. at 572–74.
219. Id. at 572 (quoting Flugence v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Flugence), 738 F.3d
126, 129 (5th Cir. 2013)).
220. Id. at 572–73.
221. Id. at 573–74.
222. Id. at 574.
223. Id. at 574–75.
224. Id. at 575–76.
225. Id. at 576.
226. Id. at 575–76.
227. 798 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2015).
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tions of the False Claims Act.228 Defendant learned of the bankruptcy
and obtained dismissal of the cause of action under a theory of judicial
estoppel.229 Here, the issue of inequity was not compelling, because the
district court provided the bankruptcy trustee an opportunity to continue
pursuing the qui tam claims.230 The trustee, however, declined. The
debtor argued that he inadvertently failed to disclose, because he had not
understood that the cause of action needed to be disclosed as he was
paying his creditors in full under his Chapter 13 plan.231 The Fifth Circuit
rejected the debtor’s argument, just as it had done in Allen.232 Because
the debtor had a large financial incentive to conceal the qui tam cause of
action, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the nondisclosure was not inadvertent and that judicial estoppel applied.233
VII. NON-CONSENSUAL THIRD-PARTY RELEASES
AND EXCULPATIONS
A. SEEKING A STANDARD, IF ANY, FOR CONFIRMATION OF NONCONSENSUAL, THIRD-PARTY RELEASES IN CHAPTER 11
PLANS—IN RE MILLENNIUM LAB
HOLDINGS II, LLC
The issue of exculpatory provisions and non-consensual third-party releases of non-debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy restructure agreements
has recently triggered a wide-spread debate amongst the circuits.234 The
widely disputed non-consensual third-party releases are widely disputed
and circuit divisions demonstrate the need for an objective, uniform standard.235 The non-consensual third-party releases provide a shield against
liability for those included in the provision. But, because the Bankruptcy
Code does not explicitly address the enforceability of these provisions,
bankruptcy courts must rely on vacillating case law to determine whether
to permit and enforce these provisions.236
Typically, a Chapter 11 reorganization plan will include an exculpatory
clause that releases specified non-debtor third parties from future liabilities concerning the debtor.237 These third parties often include the
debtor’s personnel or affiliates.238 Circuits are divided whether the provi228. Id. at 269.
229. Id. at 270.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 272–74.
232. Id. at 273–74.
233. Id.
234. See In re Airadigm Commc’n, 519 F.3d 640, 656 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Lowenschuss,
170 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 341 B.R. 92, 110 (Bankr. D. Del.
1999).
235. See In re Airadigm Commc’n, 519 F.3d at 656; In re Lowenschuss, 170 F.3d at 932;
In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 341 B.R. at 110.
236. JONATHAN P. FRIEDLAND ET AL., COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 10:22
RELEASES (2d ed. 2016).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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sions are permitted under the Bankruptcy Code.239 Arguments clash
whether these provisions are productive for the parties involved.240 Arguments for these provisions recognize that the releases provide a necessary
protection for third parties.241 In contrast, arguments against the provisions recognize the high probability that parties will abuse these provisions and take advantage of the liability shield.242 A uniform standard has
yet to be achieved.
Recently, a bankruptcy case in the Third Circuit—In re Millennium
Lab Holdings II, LLC—has brought the spotlight on the issue of nonconsensual third-party release.243 There, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware confirmed a Chapter 11 restructuring plan that
included one of the broadest and most all-encompassing nonconsensual
third-party releases.244 The ruling in In re Millennium arguably contradicted bankruptcy precedent set in the Third Circuit245 and seemingly
adopted the most permissive standard of non-consensual third-party releases in the history of bankruptcy courts.246
In In re Millennium, the bankruptcy court addressed and refuted the
Opt-Out Lenders’ contention regarding the confirmation of the exculpatory release.247 In response to the Opt-Out Lenders’ argument that “resolution of this [i]ssue requires the resolution of conflicting decisions in this
circuit and across circuits” and that the acceptance of the release conflicted with precedent, the bankruptcy court declared that the Opt-Out
Lenders misinterpreted the cases they cited.248 Contrary to the Opt-Out
Lenders’ interpretation that “nonconsensual third party releases are impermissible,” the precedent recognized that “consensual releases are permitted.”249 The bankruptcy court concluded that it acted fully within its
authority when it confirmed the plan and its third-party releases.250
In filing an appeal and stay pending appeal, the Opt-Out Lenders reiterated that confirmation of the non-consensual third-party releases was
not within the bankruptcy court’s authority because “the Third Circuit
has never ruled that non-consensual third-party releases are permissible
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 194 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); In re JohnsManville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009); In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 142
(2d Cir. 2005).
242. See id.
243. See generally In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 543 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D.
Del. Jan. 12, 2016).
244. Id. at 707.
245. See In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that the restructure plan’s third-party release was unenforceable because the “Bankruptcy Code does not
explicitly authorize the release and permanent injunction of claims against non-debtors,
except in one stance not applicable here.”).
246. See generally In re Millennium, 543 B.R. at 713.
247. Id. at 713–14.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 714.
250. Id. at 716.
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or established a standard for approving them” and that “the Non-Consensual Third-Party Release here far exceeds the outer bounds of [the
most permissive] standard.”251 Because of the inconsistency within the
Third Circuit itself and the obscure and erratic standards set forth in
other circuits, Judge Silverstein entered an order “certifying the appeal
[of this case] to the United States court of Appeals for the Third Circuit”
on January, 12, 2016.252 The Third Circuit, however, rejected certification
and appeal is currently pending in district court.
The Third Circuit’s In re Millenium decision is significant to the Fifth
Circuit because exculpatory provisions in Chapter 11 bankruptcy restructure plans is a live issue in the Fifth Circuit and is an area where the U.S.
Supreme Court is not unlikely to grant certiorari in the future. The Fifth
Circuit is one of the most conservative courts to rule on this issue, showing a preference for voiding these provisions.253 However, much like the
other circuits, the Fifth Circuit has yet to come up with a uniform or clear
standard. Instead, the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit have avoided
the issue or used varied approaches, further emphasizing the need for
clarity and uniformity in this area of law.254
Since its seminal 2009 case, In re Pacific Lumber, the Fifth Circuit’s
standard leaned toward voiding non-debtor, third-party releases and exculpations.255 Recently, however, in In re Houston Regional Sports Network, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas
approved a reorganization plan with exculpation provisions and releases
of several of the debtors’ affiliates.256 In alignment with the other circuits,
courts in the Fifth Circuit remain inconsistent with their approach to exculpatory provisions and releases, thus magnifying the relevance of this
pending Third Circuit case.257 Perhaps on appeal, the Third Circuit will
create an objective standard that will guide the Fifth Circuit and other
courts in their search for a consistent approach to nonconsensual thirdparty releases.

251. Motion of the Opt-Out Lenders for Stay Pending Appeal of Order Confirming
Amended Prepackaged Joint Plan of Reorganization of Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC,
et al. at 4, In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 543 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No.
15-12284).
252. In re Millennium, 543 B.R. at 717.
253. See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d 229, 253 (5th Cir. 2009).
254. Id. at 253; In re Patriot Place, 486 B.R. 773, 825–27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013); In re
Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners, No. 10–43400 (DML), 2010 WL 4106713, at *11 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2010).
255. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 253.
256. See Third Amended Ch. 11 Plan of Reorganization at 27, In re Hous. Reg’l Sports
Network, L.P., 514 B.R. 211 (Bank’r. S.D. Tex. 2014); Order Confirming Plan at 1, In re
Hous. Reg’l Sports Network, L.P., 514 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 13 – 35998).
257. In re Millennium, 543 B.R. at 717.
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VIII. LIEN STRIPPING
A. STRIPPING WHOLLY UNSECURED LIENS IN CHAPTER 7—BANK
AMERICA V. CAULKETT

OF

Through Bank of America v. Caulkett, the U.S. Supreme Court
strengthened longstanding principles established in the after-criticized
case, Dewsnup v. Timm,258 and provided bad news for underwater homeowners. The Supreme Court addressed whether a Chapter 7 debtor could
void a junior lien on his property, if the fair market value of the property
was less than the amount owed on a senior lien.259 The Supreme Court
set forth to resolve two consolidated cases involving lien stripping: Bank
of America, N.A. v. Caulkett and Bank of America, N.A. v. ToledoCardona.260 In both cases, the debtor owed two mortgages on his home,
against which Bank of America held the junior lien. The mortgages held
by Bank of America were completely underwater, as the value of senior
liens on each house was greater than the present fair market value of the
homes.261 In both proceedings, the debtors moved to strip the junior liens
under 11 U.S.C. § 506(d), which provides: “To the extent that a lien
secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim,
such lien is void.”262 The bankruptcy court and district court both granted
the motions under § 506(d).263 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, stating that
the court was “bound by Circuit precedent holding that § 506(d) allowed
debtors to void a wholly underwater mortgage lien.”264 Bank of America
appealed and the Supreme Court accepted the case.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held to Dewsnup, which
precluded the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 506.265 In Dewsnup,
the Supreme Court had concluded that if a claim “has been ‘allowed’
pursuant to § 502 of the [Bankruptcy] Code and is secured by a lien with
recourse to the underlying collateral, it does not come within the scope of
§ 506(d).”266 The Supreme Court defined “secured claim” under § 506(d)
as “a claim supported by a security interest in property, regardless of
whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover the
claim.”267 Thus, under the Dewsnup interpretation of § 506(d), this section voids “a lien whenever a claim secured by the lien itself has not been
allowed.”268 But in Caulkett, the Supreme Court did not reject Bank of
America’s claims.269 Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that the junior
liens were secured claims, and therefore the liens securing them were
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

502 U.S. 410 (1992).
Bank of Am. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 1995–96.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012).
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1998.
Id.
Id. at 2000–01.
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999; see also Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416.
See Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999.
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non-voidable.270
The question remaining after Bank of America v. Caulkett is whether
the decision precludes any opportunity to challenge the often-criticized
Dewsnup ruling.271 The debtors in Caulkett did not ask the court to overrule Dewsnup, so the Supreme Court applied its own precedent.272 Yet,
had it been asked, the Supreme Court seemed willing to overrule Dewsnup, noting how controversial the ruling had become.273 Caulkett’s holding, however, virtually forecloses any possible set of facts for the Supreme
Court to re-consider Dewsnup.274
IX. HOMESTEAD275
A. NON-DEBTOR SPOUSE HOMESTEAD INTEREST—IN
KIM

RE

ODES HO

In In re Odes Ho Kim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered the issue of a non-debtor spouse’s separate homestead interest and determined that (i) the bankruptcy court had the authority to
order a sale of the debtor’s residence pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 generally, despite the non-debtor spouse’s homestead interests; and (ii) the
non-debtor spouse failed to show that a constitutional taking would occur
unless she received compensation for her homestead interests in excess of
the capped exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(p).276
The case involved a creditor that obtained a judgment against the
debtor in California for more than $5,000,000.00.277 This creditor then
commenced an involuntary bankruptcy against the debtor in Texas, where
he and his spouse had purchased a homestead less than 1,215 days prior.
After conversion to Chapter 11, the debtor claimed the homestead as exempt. The creditor objected to the exemption to the extent that it was
limited by § 522(p) and tried to force the sale of the homestead to satisfy
its judgment. As a result, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding to determine the bankruptcy estate and his spouse’s interest in the homestead.278 In that adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court determined
that the spouse had no separate, vested interest that would prevent a
forced sale of the homestead or require compensation to the spouse from
the sale proceeds, aside from her interest in the capped homestead exemption under § 522(p).279 The district court and the Fifth Circuit af270. Id.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 1999–20.
273. See id. at 2001.
274. See id.
275. The two Fifth Circuit cases that follow were not covered by the prior survey,
although decided in 2014. The authors thought that they were worthy of mention as a
substantial amount of litigation has occurred in their wake.
276. Odes Ho Kim v. Dome Entm’t Ctr., Inc. (In re Odes Ho Kim), 748 F.3d 647, 656,
663 (5th Cir. 2014).
277. Id. at 650.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 651.
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firmed, although the Fifth Circuit distinguished its opinion by holding
that the spouse did hold a separate, vested property interest in the homestead apart from the debtor.280
Precedent from both the U.S. Supreme Court and Texas Supreme
Court supported the Fifth Circuit’s holding that a sale of the residence
could be forced.281 The Fifth Circuit looked to United States v. Rodgers
for the proposition that a forced sale could occur where federal law expressly permitted it, despite a third party’s interests in the property.282
There, the tax code’s authorization of a forced sale of a debtor’s homestead trumped any non-debtor’s homestead rights in preventing sale because the tax law was “the exercise of a sovereign prerogative” grounded
in the U.S. Constitution.283 The Bankruptcy Code similarly contained express authority to sell property of the estate and, similar to Rodgers, this
authority trumped a non-debtor’s homestead rights.284 The Fifth Circuit
recounted that the Texas Supreme Court recognized this conclusion in
Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, where it held that the Supremacy Clause
allowed the IRS to enforce a federal tax lien against a Texas homestead,
although not permitted by the Texas Constitution.285
The Fifth Circuit next considered whether the spouse was entitled
under the Takings Clause to compensation for loss of her homestead interest in excess of the capped exemption of § 522(p).286 This question, the
Fifth Circuit noted, would only arise where a debtor purchased his house
prior to BAPCPA because a taking could not occur where a property
interest came into existence after the enactment of a law subjecting it to
creditors’ reach.287 Here, however, the debtor and his spouse purchased
the Residence before Congress enacted § 522(p).288
The most remarkable point, and a cause of possible confusion in the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion, was its holding that the homestead interest of the
debtor’s spouse had “some value . . . separate and apart from an ownership interest in the real property on which homestead rights [we]re impressed.”289 Yet, the Fifth Circuit refused to subscribe a value or formula
to this interest.290 Instead, the Fifth Circuit placed the burden upon the
spouse to show that she was not adequately compensated by the capped
exemption afforded to her and the debtor under § 522(p).291 This ambiguity left open a door for non-debtor spouses to argue for compensation
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
1996)).
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
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654–56.
654–55 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 (1983)).
654 (citing Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 687).
654–55.
655–56 (citing Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W. 2d 657, 659–60 (Tex.
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for loss of some homestead interest due to BAPCPA provisions but left
bankruptcy courts with little guidance as to the method for valuation.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS AND HOMESTEADS
IN RE THAW

AFTER

BAPCPA—

After its ruling in In re Odes Ho Kim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit decided the case of In re Thaw on similar facts and solidified its position that a constitutional taking of a property interest could
not occur where a statute subjecting that interest to creditor liability was
created prior to the property interest.292 This meant that the debtor and
his non-debtor spouse, who had acquired their homestead after the passage of § 522(p) that limited their homestead exemption in bankruptcy,
could not prevail on a constitutional takings claim.293 The Fifth Circuit
referenced its reasoning in In re Odes Ho Kim, which was dicta because
that case involved a homestead purchased pre-BAPCPA, and noted that
the Kim opinion had issued only after the parties in Thaw had appealed.294 The factual distinction between Kim and Thaw turned the Fifth
Circuit’s discussion in Kim from dicta into precedent, and therefore, significantly limited takings clause arguments by non-debtor spouses to that
time period prior to 2005.295
C. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS AND THE TEXAS PROCEEDS RULE
CHAPTER 7—IN RE SMITH; IN RE D’AVILA; IN RE DEBERRY

IN

In In re Smith, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas considered whether a Chapter 7 trustee could seize and distribute
proceeds from a debtor’s homestead sale where the proceeds had lost
their exempt status under Texas law after the debtor received his discharge.296 Under Texas law, the proceeds of a homestead sale maintained
their exempt status if reinvested in another homestead within six months
of closing (the Texas Proceeds Rule).297 The debtor in this case failed to
reinvest within the timeframe required under the Texas Proceeds Rule.298
Applying Fifth Circuit precedent in In re Frost on the issue in the context
of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court permitted the trustee’s collection of the proceeds.299 Despite the distinction that the Chapter 7 case did not include post-petition property in the bankruptcy estate
as opposed to a Chapter 13 case, the bankruptcy court applied In re Frost,
relying upon the “snapshot rule.”300 According to the snapshot rule, initially established by the U.S. Supreme Court in White v. Stump, a court
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Thaw v. Moser (In re Thaw), 769 F.3d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 367–68.
Id. at 369–70.
See id.
Cage v. Smith (In re Smith), 514 B.R. 838, 840 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014).
Id. at 843–44 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 2001)).
Id. at 841.
Id. at 850 (citing In re Frost, 744 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2014)).
Id. at 845–46.
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should look to the exemption statute as of the day of the bankruptcy filing, as opposed to the exempt or non-exempt character of the asset on
that day to determine whether the property was subject to creditor
claims.301 The bankruptcy court noted that its ruling did not permit a
trustee to wait-and-see if a debtor would sell his homestead and fail to
reinvest in perpetuity.302 Instead, the bankruptcy court set the deadline as
the closing date of a bankruptcy case, not the discharge date.303
Whether a debtor could lose or keep his home to the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy under the Texas Proceeds Rule became an increasingly
hot topic during this Survey period and shows no signs of slowing down.
In similar factual scenarios, bankruptcy courts across Texas have both
agreed and disagreed with the holding in Smith and applied the snapshot
rule differently. In In re D’Avila, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas disagreed with Smith’s conclusion that the holding and reasoning in In re Frost applied in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.304
In that case, the bankruptcy court refused to prevent a debtor from selling her homestead during bankruptcy unless the deadline for objection to
exemptions was extended beyond the six months provided by the Texas
Proceeds Rule.305 Similarly, in In re DeBerry, the same bankruptcy court
rejected the reasoning of Smith and agreed with In re D’Avila, in a case
where a Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid and recover the transfer of
homestead sale proceeds that became exempt post-petition under the
Texas Proceeds Rule.306 With the disarray of opinions that have emerged
within the Fifth Circuit’s lower courts, it seems certain that this issue will
continue to rise in significance and have a great effect upon Texas homeowners until resolved by the Fifth Circuit.
X. CHAPTER 7
A. BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT PURPOSE AS “CAUSE” FOR DISMISSAL
A CHAPTER 7 BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASE—IN RE CYPRESS
FIN. TRADING CO., L.P.

OF

“When a bankruptcy serves no purpose, results in no benefit for its
creditors or the debtor, and only delays litigation already pending against
the debtor, there is ‘cause’ to dismiss the case.”307 This is the rule announced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in In re
Cypress, a case that defined the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) in corporate
301. Id. (citing White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 313 (1924)).
302. Id. at 850–51.
303. Id.
304. Compare In re D’Avila, 498 B.R. 150, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013), with In re
Smith, 514 B.R. at 840.
305. In re D’Avila, 498 B.R. at 159.
306. See Lowe v. DeBerry (In re DeBerry), No. 14-50406, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3694
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2015).
307. Trading Co., L.P. v. Cypress Fin. Trading Co. (In re Cypress Fin. Trading Co., L.P.),
620 F. App’x 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Chapter 7 cases.308 During avoidance litigation in Minnesota, the corporate entity (the debtor) in In re Cypress filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.309
By its own admission, the debtor had zero assets, no viable claims or
causes of action, and only listed two creditors (one of which was an inside
partner and had an interest in the entity). When the debtor filed a “Report of No Distribution” certifying that it had no assets or claims, its only
non-insider creditor sought dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings
under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a). The bankruptcy court denied the motion for
lack of bad faith, but the district court reversed, reasoning that the Chapter 7 proceedings at issue had no benefit for the corporate debtor and
only harmed the one non-insider creditor.310 To the district court, this
amounted to “cause” under § 707(a).311 The debtor appealed.312
In a theme consistently illustrated by the cases discussed in this Survey,
the Fifth Circuit noted that § 707(a), which allowed dismissal for “cause,”
did not define the term.313 The Fifth Circuit declined to create a uniform
meaning of the term based on policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code,
and instead declared that the term was intentionally broad and flexible.314 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, bankruptcy courts’ equitable roots
required them to weigh the benefits and prejudices of dismissal to the
debtors, creditors, and the bankruptcy system when deciding a § 707(a)
motion.315 Viewing the equities of this particular case, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the district court’s ruling, declaring that neither the corporate
debtor nor its two creditors received a benefit and the Chapter 7 bankruptcy was only sought to “unreasonably and unjustifiably” delay the
ongoing recovery litigation in Minnesota.316 Dismissal for cause was the
appropriate action.317
In re Cypress has sizable consequences, as the Fifth Circuit has solidified its broad approach to § 707(a) cases, at least in the corporate debtor
context. The effects of In re Cypress have reached even beyond the realm
of Chapter 7 corporate debtors, with at least one court applying the rational of In re Cypress to an individual’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy.318 It will
be interesting to see if this broadened understanding of cause under
§ 707(a) is a continuing trend. Future litigation will shine light on this
issue, but now, In re Cypress affords bankruptcy judges the necessary
freedom to decide when a corporate debtor does not deserve the benefits
of bankruptcy.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289.
Id. (citing In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Id.; see In re Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1073.
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See In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. 137, 154 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).

2016]

Bankruptcy

47

B. DISMISSAL OF AN INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCY CASE FOR “CAUSE”
UNDER § 707(A)—IN RE WILCOX, CASE 539
The holding in In re Wilcox is best summarized as a cautionary tale for
debtors: do not approach Chapter 7 bankruptcy with a cavalier attitude.319 Considering a motion for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas had to determine what actions constituted “cause” under this provision.320 In a rather
rare grant of dismissal, the bankruptcy court held that an individual
debtor who demonstrates no “hint of belt tightening” when approaching
Chapter 7 bankruptcy may not deserve the benefits of the bankruptcy
system.321
Under § 707(a), a court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case “only after notice
and hearing and only for cause.”322 Section 707(a)(1)–(3) goes on to list
actions that illustrate cause.323 Relying on this provision generally, the
U.S. Trustee (the UST) sought dismissal of a debtor’s Chapter 7 petition.324 Here, although the debtor filed his Schedules and Statement of
Financial Affairs, cooperated with the Chapter 7 trustee, and fulfilled all
other fundamental Chapter 7 duties the UST exposed the debtor’s extravagant lifestyle that he maintained despite having $4,603.32 in secured
claims and $16,920,102.09 in unsecured claims against him.325
To say the debtor’s lifestyle was irresponsible stands as an understatement. Although employed and handsomely rewarded for his status as vice
president of Atwell LLC, the debtor claimed only $2.68 in net monthly
income (a UST analysis demonstrated that the debtor could have up to
$9,016.19 in monthly net income if he cut his spending).326 In 2013, heeding the advice of his bankruptcy counsel not to pay back his debt, the
debtor stopped making payments on his credit card bills.327 That same
year, he received an IRS refund check for $204,576.328 Instead of attempting to pay off his credit card debt with the newly received funds, the
debtor decided to continue living large. His more lavish expenditures included a $22,591 pre-paid lease on a Mercedes-Benz for his wife, a
$16,813 trip to Peru and Nepal for his stepson, $18,504 in airfare and
housing expenses for him and his wife in London, San Francisco, Phoenix,
and Michigan, and close to $24,000 for goods and services at luxury retail319. See id. at 153 (“Debtor has exhibited an incredibly cavalier attitude towards the
bankruptcy system in general”).
320. Id. at 151.
321. Id. at 151–52.
322. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
323. See id. § 707(a)(1)–(3).
324. In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. at 145–46.
325. Id. at 138–39 (noting the unsecured claims included business debt and personal
credit card debt).
326. Id. at 139–41 (noting that the debtor was receiving $23,193.33 a month in salary as
well as other company benefits).
327. Id. at 141–42.
328. Id. at 141.
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ers like Nordstrom and Bloomingdales.329
The debtor not only continued to spend, he actively managed and positioned his funds in an almost deceitful manner. To avoid garnishment but
still be able to use his salary, the debtor placed his bi-weekly paycheck
from Atwell, LLC in his wife’s bank account, which was separately maintained.330 The debtor sheltered other funds by making regular and voluntary contributions to his 401(k), an amount that totaled over $37,000. Just
three months before his bankruptcy filing, the debtor still managed to
spend over $10,000 on shoes, clothing, spas, fine dining, and assorted vacations. These egregious facts led the court to state that oft-cited adage
from the Fifth Circuit—”when a pig becomes a hog it gets
slaughtered.”331
In determining whether the facts in In re Wilcox constituted cause for
dismissal under § 707(a), the bankruptcy court was fully cognizant of a
circuit split on which the Fifth Circuit had not yet sided.332 In handling
two separate corporate Chapter 7 cases, the Fifth Circuit had stated that
cause under § 707(a) was meant to be construed broadly.333 The bankruptcy court reasoned that § 707(a)(1)–(3) was an illustrative, not exhaustive list of actions that amounted to cause.334 Therefore, when
considering dismissal under § 707(a), a court should weigh the benefits
and prejudices in an equitable manner.335
This test derived by the bankruptcy court appeared to be most influenced by the Seventh Circuit’s approach, which fell in line with the ideology behind Fifth Court precedent.336 The Seventh Circuit approach to
dismissal for cause under § 707(a) harped on policy, reasoning that a
debtor who made no effort to retire his debt and continued to live an
over-the-top lifestyle did not deserve to remain in Chapter 7, as that
would be a “misuse of the protections granted by the Bankruptcy
Code.”337 This test did not require a finding of bad faith like the approaches adopted in the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits,338 but instead analyzed the circumstances of the case to fish out any deliberately
selfish behavior on behalf of the debtor.339 Even if a debtor was timely
and punctual in filing his Chapter 7 petition, the bankruptcy court determined, dismissal for cause was still appropriate if the debtor reflected “an
329. Id. at 143.
330. Id. at 142.
331. Id. at 153; see In re Swift, 3 F.3d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1993) (“There is a principle of
too much; phrased colloquially, when a pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.”).
332. See In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. at 147.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 150.
335. Id.; see In re Cypress Fin. Trading Co., L.P., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14347, at *2
(5th Cir. 2015); In re Atlas Supply Corp., 857 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1988).
336. See In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. at 150.
337. See In re Schwartz, 532 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 799 F.3d 760
(7th Cir. 2015).
338. See In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3rd Cir. 2000); In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1127
(6th Cir. 1991); In re Piazza, 719 F.3d 1253, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2013).
339. In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. at 151.
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attitude that [was] repugnant to the ‘fresh start’ principle of the Code.”340
A selfish and “I come first” bankruptcy approach was the prototypical
type of behavior the bankruptcy court did not want rewarded; dismissing
the case was necessary to maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy
process.341
It is curious to note that the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition was “dismissed
without prejudice to the [d]ebtor refiling under a Chapter 11 petition.”342
At the on-set of the Chapter 7 case, the UST had derived a 60-month
reorganization plan under Chapter 11 that would discharge 97% of the
debtor’s total debt when the debtor completed all the payments.343 The
debtor, however, ignored this alternative.
In re Wilcox proposes that a broad definition of cause aligns with Fifth
Circuit precedent and is necessary in the context of § 707(a) to afford a
court flexibility to judge the debtor’s position on a case-by-case basis.344
This flexibility allows bankruptcy courts to protect the integrity of the
bankruptcy system while promoting its two fundamental objectives: a
fresh start for the debtor and maximum distribution to creditors.345 Certainly the conclusion does not ring unfair in light of the debtor’s lavish
lifestyle. On the other hand, does dismissal for cause based on a debtor’s
spending, add new dimensions for eligibility established by the Bankruptcy Code?
Although outside the timeframe of this Survey period, the authors
thought it important to note that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in 2016 ruled on § 707(a) in the context of an individual debtor in
the case, In re Krueger.346 Consistent with the reasoning in In re Wilcox,
the Fifth Circuit adopted a broad and flexible approach to define cause,
noting that the three grounds explicitly stated in the statute were “illustrative, not exclusive.”347 The debtor filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy while a
criminal contempt proceeding was pending against him and after his state
court litigation had taken a turn for the worse. Further, the bankruptcy
court found that the debtor had perjured himself in his court documents
and testimony and threatened witnesses during the bankruptcy case to
the end of avoiding personal liability and threats to his pecuniary interests.348 The Fifth Circuit determined these were the type of “‘non-economic motives’ [that] [we]re ‘unworthy of bankruptcy protection.’”349
This ruling endorsed the reasoning in In re Wilcox that bankruptcy courts
have broad discretion to determine “cause,” including taking into account
340. Id. at 150.
341. Id. at 152–53.
342. Id. at 154.
343. Id. at 153.
344. See id. at 147.
345. See In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 188 B.R. 799, 807 (E.D. La. 1995), aff’d,
116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1997).
346. 812 F.3d 365, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2016).
347. Id. at 370; see also In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. at 150.
348. In re Krueger, 812 F.3d at 375.
349. Id. (quoting In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1994)).
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a debtor’s pre and post-petition bad faith conduct.350
C. TRUSTEE REMOVAL UNDER § 324(A)—IN

RE

IFS

When can a trustee be removed from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding? The answer seems to be at least when he uses too much of the cookie
jar, or perhaps, when he fails to disclose his mess. The holding in In re IFS
broadened the scope of § 324(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed
removal of a trustee for cause and “after notice and a hearing.”351 The
trustee in the case made several critical mistakes. Appointed in 2003 for
IFS Financial Corporation, the trustee subsequently hired his law firm to
represent him personally in his capacity as trustee and appointed his wife,
an appellate attorney at the law firm, as lead appellate counsel.352 Because the case was administered with other related cases, the trustee “initiated over 100 adversary proceedings to recover assets of several
bankruptcy estates.”353 But, the retention of his own law firm came back
to haunt him when one of those adversary proceedings required oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New
Orleans.354
The trustee turned the New Orleans trip to the Fifth Circuit into a family affair. Not only did he and his wife attend, but their two children attended as well.355 The couple’s arrival on Saturday amounted to a free
day and moderate preparation on Sunday (albeit their children were in
the room) before oral argument on Tuesday.356 This preparation involved
a $359 a night rate for the hotel room, as well as various expenses for
room service and restaurants. At the end of the trip, the trustee submitted a large, un-itemized bill for his law firm’s work that included a request to distribute $3,486.37 in estate funds as reimbursement.357 IFS’s
largest creditor objected to the proposed distribution and the bankruptcy
court agreed, deeming the trustee’s trip as an extended stay that should
have only lasted one day and amounted to $275 of reimbursement.358 The
bankruptcy court, which had already scrutinized the trustee’s hiring of his
own law firm for the bankruptcy estate, issued a show cause order as to
why the trustee “should not be removed under 11 U.S.C. § 324(a).”359
The bankruptcy court took the trustee’s behavior in prior cases into consideration and emphasized the trustee’s willingness “to put the interest of
his personal law firm ahead of the interest of the estate.”360 His actions,
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

See id. at 370–73.
In re IFS, 803 F.3d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 2015); see 11 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012).
In re IFS, 803 F.3d at 198.
Id.
See id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
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the bankruptcy court held, constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty.361
Applying the statute, the bankruptcy court removed the trustee not only
from the current bankruptcy case but from all of the cases for which he
was acting as trustee in the district.362 The trustee appealed the scope of
the bankruptcy court’s removal, arguing that the bankruptcy court’s show
cause order had provided insufficient cause for the sanction and that the
bankruptcy court erred in considering the trustee’s actions in other cases.
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, the Fifth Circuit
was left to analyze the trustee’s removal under § 324(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.363 Elaborating on what constituted “notice” under the statute, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that removal, and its extreme
consequences, required notice to be “specific enough to allow the parties
to prepare and respond to the noticed issue.”364 Specifically, reasonable
notice needed to include “the conduct immediately at issue as well as the
extrinsic conduct to be visited.”365 The trustee argued that “the bankruptcy court’s consideration of ‘contextual matters,’” like his conduct in
other cases and proceedings before the bankruptcy court, violated due
process.366 Here, the show cause order had specifically identified two different instances sufficient to put the trustee on notice that the bankruptcy
court would have questions.367 As to a third instance, the Fifth Circuit
construed its own definition of notice broadly, finding it sufficient that
the show cause order had informed the trustee he would be questioned
about “his observance of fiduciary duties.”368 Additionally, the trustee
himself provided testimony and argument at the show cause hearing regarding all the cases and proceedings about which the bankruptcy court
then questioned him.369 Regardless, the Fifth Circuit fell back on the conclusion that the bankruptcy court had not relied upon these contextual
matters in removing the trustee from pending cases in the district.370
It is noteworthy that the bankruptcy court’s ruling also withstood a
constitutional challenge, with the Fifth Circuit declaring § 324(a) constitutional both on its face and as applied.371 By operation of the statute,
removal for cause under § 324(a) removed the trustee from all cases in
which they were acting as trustee unless otherwise stipulated by the
court.372 The Fifth Circuit did not have to go far to uphold this provision
and quickly dismantled the trustee’s argument that he was denied due
process as to his automatic removal for all cases, because constitutionally
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 202.
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012).
In re IFS, 803 F.3d at 203; see 11 U.S.C. § 324(a).
In re IFS, 803 F.3d at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 208–09.
See 11 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012).
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acceptable notice and notice provided under § 324(a) were one in the
same.373
After dispensing with the issue of notice, the Fifth Circuit turned to the
issue of cause and what actions could justify removal under § 324(a).374
Rationalizing that cause was undefined in the Bankruptcy Code to afford
judges greater flexibility, the Fifth Circuit declined to create a uniform
definition.375 In light of prior precedent regarding removal for cause, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that consistently acting to advance a firm’s interest to
the detriment of the estate was legally acceptable grounds for removing a
trustee.376 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s
ruling.377
In In re IFS, the Fifth Circuit illustrated the expansive discretion provided by § 324 and the grim consequences for not adhering to legally acceptable modes of conduct. The Fifth Circuit’s insistence on maintaining
flexibility in construing cause under the Bankruptcy Code is a consistent
theme throughout its precedent, as noted above in In re Wilcox.378
Just as In re IFS’s interpretation of cause as fact-specific is not remarkable, the Fifth Circuit’s definition of notice under § 324(a) is not precedential.379 But, the Fifth Circuit’s application of this definition of notice
in In re IFS does warrant remark and should serve as a cautionary tale for
a trustee whose fiduciary duties have been called into question. The outcome of In re IFS, however, may be limited in effect to facts strikingly
similar to those in the case. Altogether, it took a highly-involved creditor,
a potentially dangerous conflict of interest, and more than three circumstances in which the same bankruptcy court expressed concern over the
trustee’s behavior to lead to the trustee’s district-wide removal. This
trifecta is unlikely to recur frequently. Still, the fact that a bankruptcy
court could eliminate a trustee’s district-wide business should cause a
trustee to approach his role with a certain amount of discretion.
XI. CHAPTER 11
A. WHEN

A

CAUSE OF ACTION BECOMES PROPERTY
PRE-CONVERSION—IN RE CANTU

OF THE

ESTATE

When a Chapter 11 debtor is an individual, the property of the estate
includes “all property of the kind specified in § 541 that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is . . .
converted to a case under [C]hapter 7.”380 Per § 541, that includes all
373. In re IFS, 803 F.3d at 209.
374. Id. at 205.
375. Id. at 206–07.
376. Id. at 208.
377. Id.
378. See In re Wilcox, 539 B.R. 137, 147 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015); see also In re Cypress
Fin. Trading Co., L.P., 620 F. App’x 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting “cause” is construed
broadly to give flexibility to bankruptcy courts).
379. See In re IFS, 803 F.3d at 203–04.
380. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(1) (2012).

2016]

Bankruptcy

53

legal rights—that is, any causes of actions belonging to the debtor.381 It
has been well-established under Fifth Circuit precedent that causes of actions belonging to the debtor prior to conversion were property of the
bankruptcy estate, “[b]ut if a cause of action [wa]s acquired at or after the
time of conversion, it belong[ed] to the individual debtor.”382
In In re Cantu, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified
how to “determin[e] whether a claim that a debtor [sought] to assert constitute[d] property of the estate.”383 The Fifth Circuit held that the “accrual approach” was the appropriate test when making this
determination.384 Under the accrual test, an injury did not occur, and
therefore, a cause of action did not accrue for purposes of inclusion in the
bankruptcy estate, until an injured party (the debtor) could institute a
cause of action.385 The Fifth Circuit noted that the focus of the accrual
test was the harm that the alleged wrongful conduct caused to the bankruptcy estate, and conversely, the benefit that any recovery would bring
to the bankruptcy estate.386
Under the facts of the case, the debtors filed their original bankruptcy
petition under Chapter 11 but could not receive approval of their plan
and their case was converted to Chapter 7. The debtors alleged that this
forced conversion occurred due to attorney malpractice. They “argue[d]
. . . that necessary injury occurred only after conversion when their assets
were liquidated and the bankruptcy court denied them discharge.”387 The
debtors wanted the settlement from their state law claim against their
attorney to fall outside of the bankruptcy estate. The Chapter 7 trustee
argued, however, that “the estate also suffered injuries from [the attorney’s] misconduct, and those injuries arose earlier, prior to the
conversion.”388
Reviewing the trustee’s argument, the Fifth Circuit “focus[ed] on
whether the allegations and causes of action in the Cantus’ petition injured the estate in a manner that would have enabled the trustee to file
the lawsuit prior to conversion.”389 The creditors, the Fifth Circuit decided, were injured in numerous ways “during the pendency of the
[C]hapter 11 bankruptcy that would have allowed the estate to file suit
prior to conversion.”390 First, the Fifth Circuit found that the misconduct
of the debtors’ attorney directly “led to the depletion of assets that could
have otherwise gone to pay creditors.”391 Even though the debtors argued that their attorney’s failure to file a motion for authorization to use
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. § 541 (a)(1).
See In re Cantu, 784 F.3d 253, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 260.
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cash collateral harmed them because it led to their unauthorized use of
cash collateral, which contributed to conversion, the Fifth Circuit found
that the impact of the attorney’s misconduct more directly harmed creditors who were deprived of the cash collateral that the debtors used.392
Second, the attorney’s failure to include valuable assets in the debtors’
schedules diverted these assets away from the bankruptcy estate.393
Third, the Fifth Circuit held that that the attorneys’ submission of an unconfirmable plan harmed not only the Cantus, but also the estate, because a confirmable plan that could reorganize the debtors would have
given creditors the benefit of the debtors’ going concern.394 If a confirmable plan was not possible, as the bankruptcy court suggested, then the
attorney should have never filed the case under Chapter 11 because the
costs to creditors would have significantly decreased in a Chapter 7
case.395 Finally, the Fifth Circuit found that the attorneys’ fees and costs
of reorganization approved by the bankruptcy court injured the bankruptcy estate by subtracting those avoidable costs from the estates
corpus.396
While there was previous confusion on whether courts should apply the
“prepetition relationship,” “middle ground” or “accrual” test when a
debtor asserted a cause of action, following In re Cantu, the Fifth Circuit
has definitively answered that question in favor of the accrual test.397 Applying the accrual test, rather than the alternative tests, will arguably
bring fewer cases into the bankruptcy estate, but the Fifth Circuit’s logic
makes sense. As the Fifth Circuit reasoned, a distinction exists between
determining when a claim occurs to provide a creditor with due process
to pursue a cause of action against a debtor, and when a claim occurs to
include within the bankruptcy estate.398 The former requires a court to
consider the pre-petition relationship between a debtor and creditor; the
latter does not.399 Additionally, the accrual test most closely aligns property interests in bankruptcy to those under state law because it looks to
substantive state law to determine when an injury occurs.400
B. VALUATION

OF A

SECURED CLAIM—IN

RE

AGE REF., INC.

In In re Age Ref., Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed four combined matters in a rather complicated fact pattern.401
The matters included an approved settlement under Bankruptcy Rule
9019, a denied motion to value a secured claim, a denied objection to an
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
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Id. at 262.
Id.
See id. at 259–60.
See id. at 259.
See id.
See id. at 258.
In re Age Ref., Inc., 801 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 2015).
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allowed claim, and an approved Chapter 11 plan.402 Under the settlement
agreement, secured lender Chase Bank (Chase) settled its claim for postpetition attorneys’ fees and interest. Chase argued it was entitled to the
post-petition interest because it was oversecured. Alternatively, under an
administrative expense theory, Chase argued that it was entitled to adequate protection if a court found that Chase was undersecured. The unsecured creditors’ committee (Committee) objected to Chase’s claim for
post-petition interest or alternatively, adequate protection, and moved
for a valuation of its collateral on the basis that it was in fact, undersecured.403 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court on all four
rulings against the Committee.404 On appeal, the Committee designated
eight issues; however, in a rare procedural step, the Fifth Circuit only
considered two, claiming that the remaining six issues challenged only the
district court and not the bankruptcy court’s findings and conclusions.405
The two issues considered on appeal were “(1) whether the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in approving the settlement agreement; and
(2) whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying the motion to value
and claim objection.”406
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the settlement agreement under the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 9019,
which provided that a settlement must be “fair and equitable and in the
best interest of the estate.”407 Whether a settlement met these requirements was determined by a three-part test: (1) the probability that the
bankruptcy estate would succeed in litigating the claim that was settled;
(2) the complexity, potential duration, inconvenience, expense, and delay
of litigating the claim; and (3) all other factors that might bear on the
prudence of the settlement.408 The Fifth Circuit was satisfied that the
bankruptcy court had undertaken an analysis of these three considerations, including the Foster Mortgage factors that included the creditors’
best interests and the extent to which the settlement was an arms-length,
good faith bargain.409 The Committee’s argument against this conclusion
hinged on valuation and priority of payments: How could the bankruptcy
court determine that the settlement of the post-petition claim for interest
and fees, which relied upon oversecured status, satisfied the Jackson
Brewing test when it did not value the collateral to verify oversecured
status?410 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit determined, the “record provide[d] support for the [t]rustee’s conclusion that the estate faced some
402. Id.
403. Id. at 536.
404. Id. at 538.
405. Id. at 538–39.
406. Id. at 539.
407. Id.; see In re Foster Mortg., 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995).
408. In re Age Ref., Inc., 801 F.3d at 540 (citing In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d 599,
602 (5th Cir. 1980)).
409. Id. (citing In re Foster Mortg., 68 F.3d at 917).
410. See id. at 542.

56

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 2

probability of failure in litigating Chase’s post-petition claim.”411 The
Committee also tried to challenge the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion with a
creative argument that Chase would have been undersecured, and unsecured creditors a bit wealthier, had the trustee elected to distribute
funds from various sales and working interest adjustments in a different
order.412 But the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, first by deferring to
the trustee’s discretion and second by noting that the timing in the case
would not have allowed the payment schedule advocated by the
Committee.413
In perhaps a stronger argument, the Committee asserted that the bankruptcy court should have valued Chase’s collateral and considered the
Committee’s objection to its post-petition claim under §§ 502(b) and
506(a).414 Section 506(a) provides that Chase was entitled to post-petition
interest to the extent the value of its collateral exceeded its “allowed
claim.”415 The Committee argued that its objection triggered § 502(b)
that required the bankruptcy court to determine the amount of Chase’s
allowed claim.416 Despite agreeing with the Committee, the Fifth Circuit
determined that the bankruptcy court implicitly overruled the objection
to claim when the bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement
and therefore, concluded that the error was harmless.417 On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit easily determined that the Committee had not
been entitled to a valuation of Chase’s collateral based on its motion for
valuation, because Bankruptcy Rule 3012 contains permissive language
that grants a bankruptcy court the discretion to value a claim upon a
party’s motion or objection.418
The bankruptcy court avoided what could have been a costly, timeconsuming, and inconvenient process in this bankruptcy case. And the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion preserved discretion in the bankruptcy courts. In
In re Age Refining, the Fifth Circuit’s deference to the bankruptcy court
in foregoing the cumbersome process of valuation, even determining that
the failure to do so was harmless under § 506(a),419 is important. As
noted by the dissent, valuing Chase’s claim and determining its oversecured or undersecured status could have had a great effect on the settlement agreement.420 According to the dissent, it was most likely for this
reason that the bankruptcy court elected not to require this valuation, but
at the same time, likely that the failure to do so was not harmless.421
411.
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C. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE IN CHAPTER 11 PLANS—IN
COUTURE HOTEL, CORP.

57
RE

Conflicts often arise regarding interest rates in Chapter 11 reorganizations, but not always to the extent that parties argue over basic methodology. Thus, when debtor Couture Hotel Corporation and creditor Mansa
disputed the proper cramdown interest rate in In re Coutoure Hotel
Corp., the confirmation hearing before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas became more contentious than most.422 Both
the debtor and Mansa relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Till v.
SCS Credit Corp423 and the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Texas Grand
Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.)424 to support their proposed methodologies
for determining interest rates. Under Till’s holding, a debtor in Chapter
13 had to use the prime-plus approach to determine an appropriate
cramdown interest rate.425 In Texas Grand Prairie, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the prime-plus approach of Till based
on the parties’ stipulation, but explicitly refused to require this approach
in the Chapter 11 context.426 Here, neither the debtor nor Mansa “stipulated that a strict, prime-plus formula should be used.”427 Although
“[b]oth parties agree[d] that a formula-based approach [wa]s the proper
method to determine the appropriate Cramdown Interest Rate,” the parties adjusted for risk from different starting points—the debtor from a
“market-based rate of interest” and Mansa from the prime.428 The two
approaches produced very different rates for purposes of cramming down
Mansa’s secured claim; the debtor proposed a 4.25% interest rate, and
Mansa proposed a 10.38% interest rate. The bankruptcy court, rejecting
the argument that it was bound by Till’s prime-plus rate, exercised its
discretion to uphold or require modification of the proposed cramdown
interest rate in piecemeal for each type of Mansa’s collateral.429
Before analyzing the dueling cramdown interest rates for purposes of a
fair and equitable analysis, the bankruptcy court concluded that the
debtor proposed its methodology for cramdown in good faith.430 Additionally, the bankruptcy court quickly dispensed with a challenge to the
proposed plan’s separate classification and lower interest rate for the
Mansa claim than other secured claims, concluding that the differing collateral underlying the secured claims justified disparate treatment.431
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541 U.S. 465, 465 (2004).
710 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 2013).
See Till, 541 U.S. at 479–80.
In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 337.
In re Couture Hotel Corp., 536 B.R. at 721.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744–49.
Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 733–34.

58

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 2

Turning to the issue of fair and equitable treatment, the bankruptcy
court was not ultimately impressed with either party’s proposed interest
rate.432 The debtor’s proposed interest rate was “based upon a range of
interest rates that [it] felt accounted for the industry risk associated with
hotel-based lending.”433 In determining these base rates, the debtor used
the “websites for Commercial Loans Direct and United Financial Group
to view the currently-offered rates on hotel loans with loan-to-value ratios similar to the proposed Mansa restructuring.”434 Using these rates,
the debtor began its risk assessment under the Texas Grand Prairie factors.435 Each factor had a low and a high range, and in the end, the
Debtor took the middle ground and settled on a rate of 4.25%.436
Unlike the debtor, Mansa “followed a strict Till analysis, beginning
with the prime rate of 3.25%.”437 From there, Mansa “adjusted the prime
rate for each of the factors discussed in Till, giving both a low and high
range adjustment for each factor” and then settled on a mid-range of
10.38%.438
According to the bankruptcy court, the debtor’s proposal was too lenient, while Mansa’s proposal was too harsh.439 Addressing the debtor’s
leniency, the bankruptcy court was not pleased that the debtor gave “a
downward to neutral adjustment based on the quality of [its] management.”440 Based on testimony about the hotel manager’s previous struggles, the bankruptcy court felt that the debtor needed to adjust upwards
for some risk regarding management, and settled upon 1.0%.441 The
bankruptcy court also recognized the risk that the debtor may not be capable of making a balloon payment at the end of a five year period and
“assign[ed] an upward risk adjustment of .75%.”442
The bankruptcy court was similarly disturbed by Mansa’s cramdown
interest rate.443 First, Mansa gave a 1.0%–2.0% increase for “circumstances of the estate,” based on, what the bankruptcy court called, “blind
reliance on the [receiver’s] report without any independent investigation.”444 The bankruptcy court criticized this blind reliance based on testimony at trial that directly dispensed with some of the problems and
inconsistencies stated within the report.445 Mansa, the bankruptcy court
held, also overstated a risk adjustment due to feasibility issues.446 In fact,
432.
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the bankruptcy court rejected Mansa’s risk adjustment, relying on the
debtor’s cash flow projections, which one expert for Mansa testified as
“reasonable and supportable.”447
Although the bankruptcy court believed that many of the problems
with the plan had been corrected when the debtor adjusted the payment
period from seven to five years, the bankruptcy court ultimately found
that the debtor’s cramdown interest rate was “insufficient to provide
Mansa with the deferred cash payments it [wa]s entitled to receive under
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(II) in light of its election under § 1111(b).”448
Thus, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s plan but gave the debtor
an opportunity to correct and propose a reasonable cramdown interest
rate.449
The bankruptcy court’s ruling in In re Couture is not simple, but the
ruling leaves practitioners with a general takeaway: the prime-plus rate
established in Till is not necessarily the appropriate formula to apply in
the Chapter 11 context, and this application should be reviewed for each
different type of collateral.450 As to what formula is necessarily appropriate, or even how to measure risk factors, practitioners gain some general
considerations. In a case that harkens to the story of Goldilocks, here, the
debtor hit the mark too low, the creditor too high, and the bankruptcy
court provided parameters for the debtor and an opportunity to modify
and get the cramdown interest rate just right.451
XII. CHAPTER 13
A. CONDOMINIUM FEES NOT “SECURITY INTERESTS” UNDER
§ 1322(B)—IN RE GREEN
“[A] Louisiana privilege is not a ‘security interest.’”452 Addressing a
matter of first impression under Louisiana law, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit determined that a condominium association’s lien
against a debtor’s condominium unit was not a consensual security interest, but a statutory lien, and thus, the anti-modification provision of 11
U.S.C § 1322(b) did not apply.453 The debtor, as owner of a condominium
unit, was subject to both the Louisiana Condominium Act (the Act) and
his community’s Condominium Declaration (the Declaration).454 Both
the Act and the Declaration granted condominium associations the privilege to file a lien against a condominium owner when the owner fails to
pay dues assessed by the association. When the debtor fell behind on assessment payments, his condominium association properly filed a lien af447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. See id. at 721.
451. See id. at 746–47.
452. In re Green, 793 F.3d 463, 469–70 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos.
v. Beckwith Mach. Co., 650 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (La. 1995)).
453. Id. at 466–67.
454. Id. at 466.
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fidavit and “obtained a default judgment against the [d]ebtor” for over
$23,000.455
After the condominium association obtained the judgment, the debtor
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and moved to avoid his condominium
association’s lien, reasoning that “after deducting the balance of his first
mortgage and the Louisiana homestead exemption, there was only $8,000
left to which the association’s lien could attach.”456 Granting the debtor’s
motion, the bankruptcy court bifurcated the association’s claim into an
$8,000 secured claim and an unsecured claim for the remaining amount.
Contesting the bifurcation, the condominium association argued that its
lien on the condominium was a security interest and, therefore, bifurcation was inappropriate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2),457 which provides that “a bankruptcy plan may ‘modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.’”458 Because the
condominium was the debtor’s principal residence, any security interest
attached to it could not be “bifurcated pursuant to the anti-modification
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322.”459 By declaring the association’s lien on
the debtor’s condominium a statutory lien and not a consensual security
interest, the bankruptcy court rendered the prohibition on bifurcation
inapplicable.460
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was left to classify the type of lien that
attached to a condominium and what was meant by privilege under applicable Louisiana state law.461 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the only “two
types of security devices that pertain to immovable property: privileges
and mortgages.”462 Even though Louisiana is the only state that uses the
term privilege, the court found that privilege retained the same meaning
as “statutory lien,” a term used by other states.463 For this reason, the
Fifth Circuit found the Act’s privilege language granted a statutory lien to
the association on the debtor’s condominium.464 Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit held that “[a] privilege [arose] only by law and . . . [could] never
be created by the consent of the parties.”465 Thus, the inclusion of the
privilege language in the Declaration was ineffective to create a security
interest between the parties.466
Having dispensed with the meaning of a privilege, the Fifth Circuit
then disposed of the idea that the association could have a mortgage, the
455.
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other security interest in immovable property.467 A conventional mortgage requires the parties to execute a written contract that includes three
things: (1) the mortgagor’s signature; (2) the amount secured; and (3) a
description of the immovable property.468 Because the condominium association did not submit any evidence of these basic requirements, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the condominium association
held a mortgage.469
The effects of In re Green may not appear far-reaching, because the
Fifth Circuit’s answer to the dispositive issue relies upon Louisiana state
law. As a byproduct of its answer, however, the Fifth Circuit solidified the
breadth and power of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b). Though the language of
§ 1322(b)(2) is relatively straight forward, In re Green shows the only interest that may not be modified under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is a
secured interest in real property that is the debtor’s primary residence,
almost conclusively limiting this provision to mortgages.470 To this end, all
other secured interests, as well as unsecured interests, may be subject to
modification under § 1322(b). By declaring the condominium association’s lien statutory and not secured by the debtor’s primary residence,
the Fifth Circuit subjected the condominium association’s claim to bifurcation under § 1322.471 As a practical effect, this rendered nearly $15,000
of the $23,303.72 judgment against the debtor an unsecured claim—a
rather bleak outcome.472 Moreover, although the term, privilege, was
unique to Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit analogized the term, statutory liens,
in other states and analyzed generic, conventional mortgages—an analysis that could apply to any state.473 The implications for condominium
and homeowners associations may be great, as courts interpreting the
laws of other states are likely to follow In re Green and reserve
§ 1322(b)(2) protection to mortgagees.
B. PLAN MODIFICATION TO ACCOUNT FOR HOMESTEAD
SURRENDER—IN RE RAMOS
Can a debtor modify his Chapter 13 plan to provide for the surrender
of a mortgaged property at the end of the case? In re Ramos answered
this question in the negative, because the specific facts of the case led the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas to strictly construe 11 U.S.C § 1329(a) with a small window for the opposite
outcome.474
Here, the debtors faced several peculiar issues. At the end of their
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. See id. at 466–67.
471. See id. at 467.
472. See, e.g., id. at 466–67 (noting the difference between the judgment obtained
against the creditor and the amount deemed a security interest is roughly around $15,000).
473. See id. at 468–69.
474. In re Ramos, 540 B.R. 580, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015).
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Chapter 13 case, the Ramos (debtors) found themselves in a bind.475 Earlier on, the debtors obtained confirmation of a 60-month payment plan in
accordance with § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan allowed
them to retain their homestead, cure prepetition default arrearages, and
resume regular postpetition payments to their home mortgage company.
The debtors partially complied with the aptly named “cure and maintain”
plan, making all of their payments to the Chapter 13 trustee (curing the
prepetition default arrears on their home loan) but failing to make numerous postpetition mortgage payments directly to their home mortgage
lender (failing to maintain).476 Neither the Chapter 13 trustee nor the
bankruptcy court discovered these direct payments until the end of the
60-month term of the plan, because the home mortgage company never
attempted to lift the automatic stay against the homestead and the debtors never spoke up about missing payments.477
With the debtors stuck at the finish line, the bankruptcy court first had
to answer whether or not a discharge was appropriate for a Chapter 13
debtor who faithfully made all plan payments to the Chapter 13 trustee
but failed to make direct postpetition mortgage payments to their mortgage lender as described in his plan.478 The bankruptcy court decisively
answered no, relying on two other bankruptcy court decisions that held
that a debtor was not entitled to a discharge under the above-mentioned
circumstances.479 Section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code entitled a
debtor to a discharge after “all payments under the plan.”480 In the bankruptcy court’s eyes, “all payments” included the direct postpetition payments to the home mortgage lender, and thus, failure to make three
years’ worth of required postpetition payments rendered a discharge for
the debtors inappropriate.481
The fact that the debtors’ failure to make postpetition direct payments
equaled a failure to make all payments under the plan was just as much
good news as bad news for the debtors, because § 1329(a) permitted a
debtor who had not finished making “all payments under the plan” to
modify the plan, subject to certain qualifications.482 Under the plain language of the statute, modification of a Chapter 13 plan was appropriate
“at any time after confirmation of the plan, but before completion of payments under such plan.”483 Qualifications included the prohibition on a
modification that “provide[d] for payments over a period that expire[d]
after the applicable commitment period . . . unless the court, for cause,
approve[d] a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that
475. Id. at 582.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 582–83; see In re Kessler, No. 09-60247, 2015 WL 4726794, at *3 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Jun. 9, 2015); see In re Heinzle, 511 B.R. 69, 78 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2014).
480. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012).
481. In re Ramos, 540 B.R. at 589.
482. Id. at 583.
483. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a).
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expire[d] after five years after such time.”484 The bankruptcy court acknowledged that “there [may] be a way to ‘fix’ an end-of-case problem
. . . so long as the ‘fix’ did not involve modifying a plan to extend plan
payments . . . over a period of more than five years.”485 Noting the split of
authority as to “whether a debtor may modify a [C]hapter 13 plan . . . to
surrender collateral to a secured creditor,” the bankruptcy court refused
to agree with the courts that had determined that “surrender” could
never satisfy this requirement and the other qualifications under
§ 1329.486 Nevertheless, the specific facts of the case, especially the timing, precluded the debtors from effecting the proposed modification.487
In determining that the facts of this case did not allow modification to
surrender, the bankruptcy court looked to § 1329(a)(1)–(4).488 Under
these provisions, one of which included the five year limitation noted
above, the bankruptcy court found no mechanism through which the
debtors could modify their plan to surrender at the late date.489 No party
had raised an issue about the missed postpetition mortgage payments until the expiration of the 60-month plan. Generally, when a debtor misses
one of these payments, the home mortgage lender will take affirmative
action by filing a motion to lift stay at some point during the Chapter 13
case.490 The stay is often lifted; the mortgage lender will foreclose, and
subsequently, file an unsecured deficiency proof of claim.491 Under these
circumstances, the bankruptcy court held a debtor could likely modify his
plan under § 1329(a)(3).492 Section 1329(a)(3) stated that a plan may be
modified post-confirmation to “alter the amount of the distribution to a
creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to
take account of any payment of such claim other than under the plan.”493
Here, however, the mortgage lender had not taken such affirmative actions.494 Even if the mortgage lender had taken action that made modification to surrender necessary, the bankruptcy court cautioned that this
modification could not violate § 1322(b)(2) and (5) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which prevented “modification of the rights of a home mortgage
lender in any plan.”495 In effect, these provisions prevented any plan
modification from denying a home mortgage lender the right to assert
“an unsecured deficiency claim against the debtor after stay relief and
foreclosure.”496 Under the specific facts of the case, due to the conclusion
of the 60-month plan and the fact that the home mortgage lender was
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undersecured, there was no mechanism by which the home mortgage
lender could file an unsecured deficiency claim.497 Any modification to
the Chapter 13 plan at this point was therefore, an inappropriate modification to the “lender’s right to assert a deficiency” under § 1322(b)(2)
and (5) of the Bankruptcy Code.498
Altogether, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s proposed plan
modification, although slightly different facts may have led to a different
result.499 It is noteworthy that the bankruptcy court refused to establish a
per se rule that modification to surrender was impermissible.500 The Fifth
Circuit has not addressed whether surrendering a residence to a mortgage
lender as full payment of a secured claim is an appropriate modification
of a plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a).501
As to the split of authority on the issue, there are two trains of thought.
One holds that a combination of certain Bankruptcy Code provisions permit modification to surrender collateral:
(a) [S]ection 1329(a)(1), since the debtor, through surrender, is . . .
reducing the amount of payments of the secured creditor down to
$0;502 (b) section 1329(a)(3), because a debtor’s surrender of collateral to a creditor is a form of payment made to that creditor other
than under the plan503; [and] (c) section 502(j) . . . since the modification, essentially, involves the court reconsidering the secured claim
and reclassifying and reducing it.504
The other adheres to the literal wording of § 1329(a) and does not permit
surrender of collateral, “as the word ‘surrender’ is simply not used in the
statute.”505 Today, the authors know of no appeal pending on this issue in
the Fifth Circuit, but it will be interesting to see if a set of facts arises,
similar to those prescribed in In re Ramos, that would set the stage for the
Fifth Circuit to weigh in on modification to surrender.
C. UNDISBURSED POST-PETITION WAGES UPON CONVERSION
CHAPTER 7—HARRIS V. VIEGELAHN

TO

With the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress addressed the previously unsettled question of whether a debtor’s postpetition earnings became a part of the new Chapter 7 estate upon conversion
from a Chapter 13 case. Unless a debtor converted in bad faith, these
497. Id. at 586.
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500. Id. at 592–94.
501. Id. at 590.
502. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (2012); see, e.g., In re Leuellen, 322 B.R. 648, 658 (S.D.
Ind. 2005) (applying § 1329(a)(1)).
503. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(3); see, e.g., In re Tucker, 500 B.R. 457, 462 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 2013) (applying § 1329(a)(3)).
504. In re Ramos, 540 B.R. at 584; see 11 U.S.C. § 502(j); see, e.g., In re Davis, 404 B.R.
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earnings did not become part of the new Chapter 7 estate under
§ 348(f).506 Instead, the earnings remained the property of the debtor—as
if the debtor had filed a Chapter 7 case initially.507 The Act also made
clear that, upon conversion, the debtor did not have a right to a return of
any postpetition earnings already distributed to creditors as part of the
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan prior to conversion.508 But upon conversion,
what happens to the debtor’s postpetition earnings that are in limbo—
funds that had already been remitted to the Chapter 13 trustee but not
yet disbursed to creditors? This was the question the U.S. Supreme Court
answered in Harris v. Viegelahn.509
In this case, the Chapter 13 trustee did not distribute a portion of the
debtor’s payments under his Chapter 13 plan to his mortgagee post-foreclosure. As a result, this portion of the debtor’s postpetition wages accumulated in the Chapter 13 trustee’s possession.510 A year after the funds
began accumulating, the debtor converted his case to a Chapter 7 case,
and the Chapter 13 trustee subsequently used the accumulated wages to
pay her fees, the debtor’s attorneys’ fees, and unsecured creditors. Claiming the Chapter 13 trustee lacked authority to distribute these funds to his
creditors, the debtor successfully filed a motion directing a refund of the
wages distributed post-conversion.511 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed and reversed, concluding that the creditors’ claim to the accumulated funds were superior to the debtor’s claim.512 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the debtor’s receipt of these funds would constitute a windfall, and these funds rightfully belonged to creditors.513
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, holding that a debtor was entitled to the return of any postpetition wages not
yet distributed by the Chapter 13 trustee upon conversion to Chapter
7.514 Although acknowledging that the Bankruptcy Code did not explicitly answer this question,515 the Supreme Court concluded that allowing a
terminated chapter 13 trustee to distribute accumulated wages post-conversion would be “incompatible with [the] statutory design.”516 Because
§ 348(f)(1)(A) allowed good faith debtors to remove postpetition wages
from the converted Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate while bad faith creditors
were penalized under § 348(f)(2) by making these wages available for
creditors, the most sensible reading of the statute was to refrain from
imposing a similar penalty upon good faith debtors by allowing accumu506.
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lated wages to return to the debtor upon conversion.517 The Supreme
Court additionally reasoned that “payment to creditors” was a core service provided by the Chapter 13 trustee under § 1326(c)—a service that
the Chapter 13 trustee could not provide when the case was converted to
a Chapter 7 case.518 By contrast, merely returning undistributed funds to
the debtor was not a Chapter 13 service.519 Thus, the Chapter 13 trustee
had no authority to distribute the funds to creditors upon conversion and
instead, should have returned the funds to the debtor.520
While there is merit to the Fifth Circuit’s observation that the debtor’s
ability to obtain receipt of undisbursed wages upon conversion was completely dependent upon the trustee’s ability to make timely distributions
to creditors,521 the Supreme Court’s holding seems most consistent with
Congress’ statutory goal of giving a fresh start to debtors by not overpenalizing them for attempting to complete a Chapter 13 plan before converting to a Chapter 7.522 At first glance, this case seems to be a big win
for debtors. The impact of the case, however, will almost certainly be mitigated—if not eliminated completely—by the response of Chapter 13
trustees and perhaps interested creditors, who will likely seek to include a
regular disbursement schedule of all collected funds within the Chapter
13 plan.
XIII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A number of changes to statutes and rules affecting debtor and creditor
relations went into effect during this past Survey period, including a big
increase in the Texas personal property exemptions and changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, at least at the Commission
level, changes are being introduced to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Below is a brief summary of the highlights.
A. CHANGES

TO THE

FEDERAL RULES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) that
took effect on December 1, 2015, are projected to influence numerous
aspects of civil litigation, most notably service of process, discovery, default judgments, and possibly pleadings requirements in patent cases.523
Some of these changes are of significant importance and should be noted
for their practical implications.
Some rules have been amended in what appears to be an effort to reduce delay and improve cooperation in early case management. Rule
4(m) has changed the time to serve a defendant from 120 days to 90
517. Id. at 1837–38.
518. Id. at 1838.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See id. at 1839.
522. See id. at 1837.
523. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, 84, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AFG-54H6].
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days.524 Rule 16 no longer provides for scheduling conferences by “telephone, mail, or other means” and the time for a court to issue a scheduling order is now the earlier of 90 days (down from 120 days) after any
defendant has been served, or 60 days (down from 90 days) after any
defendant has appeared.525 The amended Rule 16 also allows scheduling
orders to address the preservation of electronically stored information
(ESI) and incorporates the parties’ agreements for asserting claims of
privilege and work-product protection.526 These amendments encourage
direct communication between the parties involved. And the reduced
time for entry of a scheduling order and discovery conference will likely
enable the parties to set the tone and expectations at the onset of
litigation.
Rule 26 has been narrowed, now mandating that discovery be relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case.527 Proportionality considerations under Rule 26 are not new, but
Rule 26(b)(1) now makes proportionality considerations part of the definition of the scope of discovery and reinforces the parties’ obligations to
consider proportionality in making discovery requests, responses, and objections.528 Relating to requests for production of documents and reflecting a new streamlined approach to discovery, the amended Rule 26
allows requests for production to be sent before the Rule 26(f) conference;529 the amended Rule 34 requires objections “with specificity,” requires responses to state whether documents are being withheld, and
provides a reasonable time for production;530 and the amended Rule 37
permits a party to move for an order compelling production if another
party fails to produce documents.531
Further, Rule 37(e) adopts a uniform standard, now providing broad
discretion for courts to cure prejudice caused by loss of ESI, a solution
that resolves a circuit split concerning when courts may impose more severe sanctions for failures to preserve ESI.532 The last change worth mentioning deals with Rule 55, which now clarifies that a default judgment
that does not dispose of all of the claims among all parties is not a final
judgment, unless so directed by the court.533 Thus, a court may revise a
default judgment until final judgment is entered.534
If appropriately enforced, these amendments to the Federal Rules alter
the discovery landscape. Proper adherence will expedite the resolution of
the issues, decrease discovery costs, and focus parties and courts more on
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the claims and defenses at bar. Attorneys would be wise to memorize and
leverage these new amendments.
B. INCREASE IN TEXAS PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS—§ 42.001
OF THE TEXAS PROPERTY CODE
Texas has long been known for its generous exemption laws, and with
the passage of a recent amendment to the Texas Property Code, the Lone
Star State has become even more debtor-friendly. Section 42.001(a) now
allows families to exempt up to $100,000 of personal property and allows
individuals to exempt up to $50,000—a substantial increase from the former amounts of $60,000 and $30,000 for families and individuals, respectively.535 Texas also allows a wide variety of personal items to be
exempted, including jewelry, home furnishings, tools, and two firearms.536 They say everything is bigger in Texas and, with this amendment,
it clear that the adage certainly applies to protections for the personal
property of debtors.
C. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION AMENDMENTS TO
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

THE

UNIFORM

On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission renamed the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act as the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
(UVTA) and made a number of amendments to the Act, for the first time
since its promulgation.
The high points of these amendments included changing the term
“fraudulent” transfer to “voidable” to clear up the confusion surrounding
the intent or bad act aura that surrounded targets of the Act. The UVTA
altered and clarified the burden of proof for a cause of action under the
Act, expressly placing a preponderance of the evidence burden upon the
creditor-claimant as to each element, with one caveat.537 This caveat referred to the long-standing rebuttable presumption under the Act that a
debtor was insolvent if it failed to pay its debts as they became due.538 As
amended, the UVTA now qualifies this rebuttable presumption in two
ways: (i) debts that are subject to a bona fide dispute do not count towards the rebuttable presumption; and (ii) the debtor bears the burden to
prove the rebuttable presumption by a preponderance of evidence.539
In an amendment unfavorable to secured creditors, the UVTA eliminated protection for “strict foreclosures,” which will now be subject to
fraudulent transfer claims under the Act.540 Strict foreclosures occur
where a debtor voluntarily agrees to surrender property in full or partial
535. TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.001(a) (West 2014).
536. Id. § 42.002(a).
537. See UNIFORM VOIDABLE TRANSFER ACT § 4(c) (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.
org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2014_AUVTA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/585C-P866].
538. See id. § 2(b).
539. See id. § 8 cmt. 5.
540. See id. § 10(a).
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payment of a debt secured by the property after the debtor has
defaulted.541
Finally, in a move that eases the burden of courts addressing claims
under the Act and possibly prevents forum-shopping, the UVTA now
eliminates any choice-of-law ambiguity by establishing that the substantive law of the place of the debtor’s location at the time of the transfer
applies.542 The location of an individual debtor is considered to be his
primary residence.543 Similarly, the location of an entity is its primary
place of business, unless it has multiple places of business, in which case
the location is the entity’s chief executive office.544
So far, it seems that these amendments have been introduced in legislatures in Massachusetts and Indiana.545 Whether Texas follows is unclear
at the time of this Survey. In the past, however, the adoption of uniform
statutes regarding transfers has only taken a matter of time, and the authors include this in the Survey for your information.
XIV. CONCLUSION
During this Survey period, bankruptcy judges and practitioners gained
clarity on the authority of the bankruptcy courts. In addition, lawyers
who are paid by the bankruptcy estate won a big victory in the Fifth Circuit, with the overruling of the problematic Pro-Snax decision. Finally, as
the authors point out, some of the decisions covered in this Survey are
not over, but are on their way up the appellate ladder, hopefully ripe for
coverage next year. As for changes to statutes and rules, amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seem geared towards eliminating or
at least minimizing the burden of discovery and disputes. The authors
hope these changes prove useful to those parties and attorneys putting
forward a good faith effort towards discovery compliance and case resolution. Finally, once again highlighting Texas’ reputation as a debtorfriendly state, debtors have cause to celebrate the increase in what were
already robust personal property exemptions.

541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. § 10 cmt. 1.
id. § 10.
id.
id. § 10(b).
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